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NOTES
THE SUPREME COURT AS PROTECTOR OF POLITICAL MINORITIES*
THE HANDFUL of Supreme Court decisions dealing with the limits im-
posed by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment upon the
power of the states to restrain political expression vary sufficiently on their
facts to make possible any number of distinctions and conflicting generaliza-
tions.' Since sedition, criminal syndicalism and anti-insurrection statutes
are generally conceded to be within the power both of the states and of the
federal government, 2 the constitutional issue in every case is whether the
statute involved can be construed, consistently with due process of law, or
with the bill of rights in the case of a federal act, to apply to the particular
activities with which the defendant is charged.3 In the first Supreme Court
decision under the war-time Federal Espionage Act Mr. Justice Holmes
limited the exercise of the restrictive power of the federal government to
words which were used in such circumstances and were of such a nature
as to "create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the sub-
stantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent."' 4 That this formula,
at least as Mr. Justice Holmes meant it, did not become the working rule
of the Court is attested by the three occasions on which he found it necessary
to dissent when convictions under the Espionage Act were affirmed.0 And
later, in the Gitlow case, involving the New York Criminal Anarchy Law,0
the Court, while paying homage to the "clear and present danger test" as
applied to utterances which the legislature had defined as criminal by a
reference to their consequences, refused to apply the same test to expres-
sions of a class which, it held, had been deemed by the state legislature to
be potentially so dangerous as to be prohibited in themselves. Under a
statute of the latter type, according to the Court, any specific utterance fall-
*De Jonge v. Oregon, 57 S. Ct. 255 (1937); Herndon v. Lowry, 182 Ga. 582, 186
S. E. 429 (1936), probable jurisdiction noted, 57 S. Ct. 193 (1936).
1. For general treatments of recent developments in this field, see Legis. (1935)
35 COL. L. REV. 917 (federal legislation), (1936) 84 U. OF PA. L. REV. 390 (state
legislation).
2. Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47 (1919) (federal espionage act); Gilbert
v. Minnesota, 254 U. S. 325 (1920) (state sedition law) ; Gitlow v. New York, 268
U. S. 652 (1925) (state criminal anarchy law); Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357
(1927) (state criminal syndicalism law): see Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359,
369 (1931) (state red-flag law).
3. It was not understood that the due process clause limited the power of the
states to abridge free speech until Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652, 666 (1925).
See Warren. The Ncw "Liber'ty" under the Fourteenth Amendment (1926) 39 HARv.
L. REV. 431.
4. Schenck v. United States, 249 U. 5. 47, 52 (1919).
5. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919) ; Schaefer v. United States,
251 U. S. 466 (1920) : Pierce v. United States, 252 U. S. 239 (1920).
6. N. Y. PENAL LAW §§ 160, 161.
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ing within the prohibited class might be punished without regard to the
probability of its effecting the results which the statute was intended to
prevent.7
Some further delineation by the Supreme Court of the boundary between
the power of the state and tile immunity of the individual with respect to
political expression may result from the most recent development in the
case of Angelo Herndon, a Negro Communist. Herndon was given a twenty-
year prison term for attempting to incite insurrection under a Georgia
statute of the carpetbagger era which provided that "any attempt, by per-
suasion or otherwise, to induce others to join in any combined resistance to
the lawful authority of the State shall constitute an attempt to incite in-
surrection." The literature in Herndon's possession, some of which was
found in sufficient quantities to indicate that he kept it for distribution,
declared that Communists favored "a revolution, not a reformation," and
"self-determination for the Black Belt." The latter objective was to be
retded by confiscation of the property of white landowners and the estab-
lishment of a Negro state composed of all districts containing a popular
majority of Negroes, with the right to secede from the Union. The verdict
of guilty was returned despite an instr~uction that the jury must find, in
order to convict, that immediate, serious violence had been advocated. On
an appeal based upon the insufficiency of the evidence on this issue the
Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed, holding that danger of immediate vio-
lence was not a requisite of the offenseY A rehearing on the ground that
the statute as thus construed was repugnant to the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment was denied, because the constitutional issue had
not been raised at the trial;1O and an appeal to the Supreme Court of the
United States was dismissed on the same ground.21 Herndon then applied
for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that the statute was void, both because
it was too indefinite to provide an ascertainable standard of guilt and be-
cause it violated the right of free speech as guaranteed by state and federal
constitutions. This time Herndon succeeded in the trial court, upon the
first ground alone: but the Supreme Court of Georgia upheld the statute as
against both objections and remanded the prisoner to the custody of the
sheriff.12 A further appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States has
been taken and arguments have at this writing been heard.
13
7. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652, 670 (1925).
8. GA. CODE (1933) § 26-902. This statute was originally enacted to prevent slave
revolts and was reenacted in 1866 in general terms, but with the purpose of preventing
uprisings among the recently freed Negroes. See Brief for Plaintiff-in-Error, p. 34,
Herndon v. Lowry, 182 Ga. 582, 186 S. E. 429 (1936).
9. Herndon v. State, 178 Ga. 832, 174 S.E. 597 (1934).
10. Herndon v. State, 179 Ga. 597, 176 S. F& 620 (1934).
11. Herndon v. Georgia, 295 U.S. 441 (1935) (Cardozo, Brandeis, and Stone, JJ.,
dissenting), (1935) 35 Cot- L. REv. 1145, (1935) 49 HAIRV. L REV. 150, (1935) 84 U.
OF PA. L. REv. 256. The majority opinion declared that. in the light of Carr v. State,
176 Ga. 747, 169 S. E. 201 (1933), the defendant should have foreseen at the trial the
broad interpretation which was given the statute on appeal.
12. Lowry v. Herndon, 182 Ga. 582, 186 S.E. 42-9 (1936).
13. Herndon v. Lowry, 57 S. Ct. 193 (1936) (probable jurisdiction noted).
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Inasmuch as the Georgia court has relied upon the rationale of the Gitlow
case in its interpretation of the statute, there is apparently a sufficient legal
basis for affirming its action. 14  For Herndon's literature was much more
specific in its proposal to overturn the existing social order than Gitlow's
"Left Wing Manifesto." But times have changed. Both Gitlow v. New
York and Whitney v. California,15 the latter case upholding the conviction
of an organizer of the Communist Labor Party, arose during the post-war
-'Red scare" of 1919. An I.W.W. member who agitated for the "class
struggle" and the overthrow of capitalism four years later, on the other
hand, eventually had his conviction reversed by the Supreme Court. 16 Per-
haps radical political ideas which seemed to the Court sufficiently dangerous
to be suppressed when advocated during and immediately after the war had
lost their virulence by 1923.17 In any event the Supreme Court has since
issued a notable series of opinions in due process cases involving civil rights,
the recent ones written in the stirring accent of liberal orthodoxy.' 8
Some indication, at least, that this trend may modify the reactionary
post-war case- on political rights may be found in a current decision of the
Supreme Court relating to freedom of assembly. Dirk De Jonge, a member
of the Communist Party, was given a seven-year prison term under the
Oregon Criminal Syndicalism Law' 0 for speaking at a meeting held under
the auspices of that party to protest against police interference' in a recent
longshoremen's strike. There was no evidence of any disorder or of the
advocacy of any unlawful conduct at the meeting. The Supreme Court
of Oregon, although it limited the charge to the defendant's participation
in a meeting called by the Communist Party, relied upon evidence intro-
duced as to the general program of that party in Oregon and sustained the
conviction without regard to anything said or done at the particular meeting
14. See Herndon v. State, 179 Ga. 597, 603, 176 S. E. 620, 623 (1934) ; Carr v.
State, 176 Ga. 55. 57. 166 S.E. 827, 828 (1932). At the same time the Georgia Statute
(cited note 8, supra) may well be held unconstitutional without departing from the
post-war decisions upholding the much narrower type of sedition and criminal syndi-
calism statute then in vogue.
15. 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
16. Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U. S. 380 (1927); cf. also Stromberg v. California, 283
U.S. 359 (1931) (conviction under red-flag statute reversed). Although the Fiske
case and Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357 (1927), cited supro note 15, were decided
by the Supreme Court on the same day, the Whitney case arose four years earlier.
17. Burns v. United States, 274 U.S. 328 (1927), another case arising in 1923,
must be distinguished. Conviction was affirmed because the defendant urged long-
shoremen to load ships in such a manner as to endanger lives and property aboard the
vessels-a scheme which would be considered "dangerous" in itself without regard to
the possibility of a revolution.
18. Powell v. Alabama. 287 U.S. 45 (1932); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U. S. 587
(1935) ; Patterson v. Alabama. 294 U. S. 600 (1935) ; Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278
(1936). Cf. Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935) ; Grosjean v. American Press
Co.. 297 U. S. 233 (1936) : see also cases cited infra note 27.
19. ORE. CODE Axs'. (Supp. 1933) § 14-3110.
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in question.20 The Supreme Court of the United States, in al opinion by
the Chief Justice, unanimously reversed on the ground that "the Oregon
statute as applied to the particular charge as defined by the state court is
repugnant to the due-process clause." 2 ' That the "Communist Party as
such did advocate the doctrine of criminal syndicalism," the Court said,
was a "fact which is not disputed on this appeal." ' The result of this
decision is that something more must be shown in order to convict a person
for participating in a political meeting than the advocacy of criminal syndi-
calism by the organization which has sponsored it. This is significant.
It means apparently that all evidence as to the seditioug nature of Com-
munist or other "radical" principles generally, which is always introduced
at the trial with the effect of damning any admitted Communist in the eyes
of the jury, is to be excluded as irrelevant unless it can be shown that the
defendant himself advocated those doctrines. And this is the first time the
Supreme Court has invoked the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to condemn state interference with political expression as abridging the
constitutional guaranty of freedom of assembly as well as that of freedom
of speech.23 But, if doctrine is important in these cases, the amount of com-
fort that Herndon can derive from De Jonge v. Oregon is slight. The Court
did not decide that it would be unconstitutional for a state to convict a
member of the Communist Party, or of any party preaching criminal syndi-
calism, "for participating in its organization, or for joining it, or for soliciting
members or for distributing its literature.
2 4
So long, at least, as the Supreme Court is unwilling to depart from its
earlier decisions sustaining the constitutionality of criminal syndicalism
statutes,2 5 occasional decisions of this sort concerning their application in
individual cases, though welcome, will necessarily be confined to the formu-
lation of procedural rules for the police supervision" of radical political ac-
tivity. When the problem is one of discovering the boundary between the
police power of the state and the liberty of the individual, greater certainty
can hardly be expected in cases concerning freedom of speech, press and
assembly than in due process cases generally. Insofar. however, as legal
doctrine can offer any protection against persecution, whether it be due to
the arbitrary action of local officials or to the popular prejudices of a par-
ticular period or locality, the mere possibility of interference by the Supreme
Court should serve to restrain ill-considered and unnecessarily harsh de-
cisions by the state and lower federal courts, and perhaps even to limit
20. State v. De Jonge. 152 Ore. 315. 51 P. (2d) 674 (1935), (193t,) 24 GEo. L J.
744. Two judges dissented, on the basis of excessive penalty, errors in admission of
evidence, and appeal to prejudice in the argument of state's counsel to the jury.
21. De Jonge v. Oregon, 57 S. Ct. 255, 260 (1937), (1937) 30 HARV. L REv. 6S9.
22. Id. at 258.
23. See note 3, supra.
24. De Jonge v. Oregon, 57 S. Ct. 255. 259 (1937). Membership in such an organ-
ization has been held punishable. State v. Boloff. 138 Ore. 568. 4 P. (2d) 326 (1931).
aff'd on rehearing, 138 Ore. 568, 7 P. (2d) 775 (1932): State v. Hennessey, 114 Wash.
351. 195 Pac. 211 (1921): cf. Whitney v. California. 274 U. S. 357 (1927).
25. See note 2, sitpra.
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invasions of constitutional rights by the police. The salutary effect of this
factor would seem to be fortified by the apparent disposition of the present
Supreme Court to protect civil liberties. 26 Although De Jonge is only the
third person whose conviction as a "dangerous radical" has been reversed
in the Court's history, 2 7 all three cases have been decided within the past
decade, whereas the other cases of this type which have been reviewed
by the Court are clustered in the post-war period of anti-Red hysteria.2 8
Despite the hesitation of those who fear that interference with local political
sentiments may provoke a certain amount of resentment leading to intensi-
fied persecution of unpopular minorities, 29 affirmation by the Supreme Court
of its interest in civil rights should, besides setting a standard for judicial
and executive authorities generally throughout the country, contribute to
the education of public opinion, on which, of course, the protection of civil
liberties ultimately depends.30
IMPLIED DUTIES OF A CORPORATE TRUSTEE UNDER AN INDENTURE*
Ix 1928 the United Steel Works Corporation of Germany issued a
$15,000,000 series of notes secured by a pledge of assets held in Germany
by an agent of the trustee under the indenture. In 1934, when German
26. See note 18, supra.
27. The other two cases were Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U. S. 380 (1927), and Strom-
herg v. California. 283 U. S. 359 (1931). Cf. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697 (1931)
(state injunction law to suppress libel held violation of freedom of press under Four-
teenth Amendment).
28. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (federal espionage act); Sugar-
man v. United States, 249 U. S. 182 (1919) (same) ; Frohwerk v. United States, 249
U.S. 204 (1919) (same); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919) (same);
Stilson v. United States. 250 U. S. 583 (1919) (same) Abrams v. United States, 250
U.S. 61!6 (1919) (same) : Schaefer v. United States, 251 U.S. 466 (1920) (same);
Pierce v. United States. 252 U.S. 239 (1920) (same): Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U. S.
325 f1920) (-tate sedition law): Gitlow v. New York. 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (state
crimival anarch% law): Burns v. United States, 274 U. S. 328 (1927) (state criminal
syndicalism law enforced in national park) : Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927)
(-tat-- rimina; yndicalism law).
29. .\ century ago Georgia citizens became so incensed when the Supreme Court
,.i the United State, rever. ed the conviction of a Cherokee Indian charged with murder
that the, i.romptlt c\ecuted the Idian. See 2 NVARREX. THE SUPREME CoiRT IN
UN ITED S\r-.%m HI.TOR (1922) 193.
30. Compare the language of .\lexander Hamilton, writing in TuE FEDERALIST,
No. 84: "What is the liberty of the press? Who can give it any definition which would
not leave the utmost latitude for evasion? I hold it to be impracticable; and from
this I infer that its ecurity. whatever fine declarations may be inserted in any consti-
tution respecting it, must altogether depend on public opinion, and on the general
spirit of the people and of the government. And here, after all, as is intimated upon
another occasion, must we seek for the only solid basis of all our rights." See Comment
(1920) 33 HARv. L. REv. 442.




moratorium laws caused default on both principal and interest of the notes,
the Chase National Bank, successor trustee, was a large creditor of the
issuer of the notes and also held for its account deposits and securities
amounting to about $1,000,000. No notice of default or request that the
trustee sue, specified in the indenture as conditions precedent to the trustee's
duty to proceed against the issuer, was made by the noteholders; but the
Chase Bank received actual knowledge of default in several ways.' The
trustee allowed the United Steel Works to remove to Germany the deposits
and securities mentioned above,2 and later received payments on its own
indebtedness. At no time did it take any action to enforce the rights of the
noteholders.
A representative action was brought by noteholders in the New York
Supreme Court to remove the trustee and to have it account for damages
caused by the release of assets which it might have attached for the benefit
of noteholders and for a share in the subsequent receipts which it had applied
entirely to its own indebtedness. Justice Cropsey rendered judgment for
the plaintiffs3 on the ground that an implied obligation to enforce the note-
holders' rights arose when the trustee obtained knowledge of default, and
that this obligation was violated when it collected its own debt to the ex-
clusion of the claims of noteholders,4 and also when it failed to attach the
free assets of the debtor which were withdrawn to Germany. The exculpa-
tory clauses which provided that the trustee might assume that there had been
no default until receipt of notice from 25% of the noteholders and was to
be liable to noteholders only for wilful or intentional default in the perform-
ance of its duties were held inapplicable because the conduct of the trustee
if protected would defeat the purpose of the trust. It was stated, however,
1. An attorney representing noteholders requested action, and the trustee learned
from its agent in Germany that the German moratorium prevented transfer of collateral
to New York. This attorney later sued on the notes, and attached assets in the hands
of the trustee. Glynn v. United Steel Works Corporation, 10O Misc. 405. 289 N.Y.
Supp. 1037 (Sup. Ct. 1935). Later, execution was issued against these assets. Ii re
Glynn, X. Y. L. J.. Sept. 20, 1935. p. 850, col. 3 (N. Y. Sup. CL). The trustee filed
a written return in the first of these suits claiming a banker's lieu, and resisted a turn-
over order in the second on the same ground.
2. The assets, at that time in the hands of the Sheriff, were turned over to the
attorney for the United Steel Works Corporation by order of the court. Prezumably
the trustee could have attached them prior to the final turnover order by filing a suit
for all the noteholders similar to that filed by some in Glynn v. United Steel Wo rks
Corp.. 160 Misc. 405. 289 N. Y. Supp. 1037 (Sup. Ct. 1935). See Collateral Trust
Indenture between Gelsenkirchen Mining Corp. and the Xational Park Bank of New
York, Trustee, March 1. 1928. (the indenture involved in this suit) Article VIII.
§§ 3, 4. 5 (pp. 53-55) in which the trustee is empowered to recover judgment for the
whole amount of the defaulted principal and interest.
3. Starr v. Chase National Bank, X. Y. L. J.. Sept. 21. 1936, p. 771. col. t (X. Y.
Sup. Ct.), (1937) 37 CoL L REv. 130. (1937) 4 U. OF Cut. L. REv. 346.
4. The court did not distinguish this ground of liability from that predicated
upon the failure of the trustee to attach, nor did it indicate upon what basis the pay-
ments to the trustee should be apportioned between the trustee and the noteholders.
For a competent discussion of this issue, see (1937) 4 U. oF Cm. L REv. 346.
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that, if these clauses were applied, the trustee's conduct here amounted to
wilful default.5
The cases involving the duties of indenture trustees are sometimes descrilbed
as falling into two classes. in one of which these duties are said to be strictly
limited by the indenture, while in the other additional duties are implied
from the nature of tie trust relationship.; This statement creates an appear-
ance of a "'division of authority," with the implication of a choice between
coniflicting rules,7 which the cases do not justify. The typical trust inden-
ture confers many powers upon the trustee, which become duties only upon
the request of a specified number of bondholders, and perhaps the tender
of indemnity for expenses incurred while pursuing the duty. Usually a
general "exculpatory clause" exonerates the trustee from all liability except
that arising from gross negligence or bad faith.8 If, among the individuals
composing the personnel of the corporate trustee, no one who might require
action to be taken to protect the interests of bondholders actually knows of
facts which make such action necessary, the provisions of the indenture may
he followed, even to the extent of occasionally indulging in a little negli-
gence.11 without incurring liability to bondholders.10  The cases so holding,
however, indicate clearly that, regardless of the terms of the indenture,
liability may be imposed upon the trustee for failure to act where its appro-
priate and responsible officers have knowledge of the necessity to act in
5. The finding of wilful default and bad faith was clearly not the basis of the
decision. "We are not here concerned with the definition of what constitutes 'wilful
or intentional default'." But cf. (1937) 37 COL. L. REV. 130.
6. Payne, Exculpatory Clauses in Corporate Mortgages and Other Instruments
(1934) 19 CORN. L. Q. 171. 173: Posner. Liability of the Trustee under the Corporate
Indenture (1928) 42 HARV. L. REV. 198, 244; (1937) 37 CoL. L. REv. 130.
7. See (1937) 37 COL. L. REV. 130, in which the instant case is contrasted with
Hazzard v. Chase Nat. Bank, 159 Misc. 57, 287 N. Y. Supp. 541 (Sup. Ct. 1936).
8. For general discussion of these familiar provisions see SECURITIS AND EX-
CHANGE ComI.ussIox. REPORT ON TIE STUDY AND INVESTIGATION OF TIIE WORK,
ACTIVITIES. PERSONNEL AND FUNCTIONS OF PROTECTIVE AND REORGANIZATION CONI-
MITTEES. PART Vt. TRUSTEES UNDER INDENTURES (1936), commented upon in McCol-
lum. The S. LE. C. and Corporate Trustees (1936) 36 COL. L. REV. 1197; Posner, The
Trustee and the Trust Indenture: .4 Further Study. (1937) 46 YALE L. J. 737; Posner,
sttpra note 6. at 198: Payne. supra note 6, at 171; Fowler, Legal Responsibility of
Trustees under Corporate Bonds and .lortgages. or Deeds of Trust (1890) 24 Amr.
L. RE%-. 703: Comments (1936) 46 YALE L. J. 97; (1933) 33 COL. L. REV. 97; (1936)
22 'x. L. RF.v. 455: Case notes. (1932) 41 YALE L. J. 774; (1934) 18 I NN. L. REV.
605.
9. Browning v. Fidelity Trust Co.. 250 Fed. 321 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1918) ; Fleener
v. Omal:a National Co.. 267 N. XV. 462 (Neb. 1936) ; Hazzard v. Chase Nat. Bank,
159 Misc. 57. 287 N. Y. Supp. 541 (Sup. Ct. 1936).
10. Browning v. Fidelity Trust Cu.. 250 Fed. 321 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1918); Benton
v. Safe Deposit Bank of 'ottsville. 255 N. Y. 260. 174 N.E. 648 (1931); Hazzard
v. Chase Nat. Bank, 159 Mikc. 57. 287 N.Y. Supp. 541 (Sup. Ct. 1936); Fay v. New
York Trust Co.. N. Y. L. J., Oct. 30, 1936, p. 1455, col. 7 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.); Newhall
v. Norristown Trust Co., 280 Pa. 195, 124 Atl. 337 (1924).
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behalf of the bondholders." No case holds that in spite of such knowledge
the trustee need not act.1 2 In the most frequently cited cases in which non-
indenture duties have been implied, the duty was based upon the fact that
the trustee, because of knowledge, was in a position to act to protect the
bondholders.13  Non-indenture duties may also be implied if the trustee
attempts to limit its duty to act in a situation in which there is no other
protection for the bondholders.' 4
The grounds for imposing implied duties on a trustee after default of
principal or interest have been obscured by uncritical repetition of a broad
statement in an early case in which duties, or rather powers, to act after
default were implied in order to enable the trustee to act in spite of the
opposition of bondholders.15 There seems to be no persuasive reason for
11. Browning v. Fidelity Trust Co., Hazzard v. Chase Nat. Bank, both supra note
9; See Fay v. New York Trust Co., N. Y. L J., Oct. 30, 1936, p. 1455, col. 7 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct.) at p. 1456, col. 1. "The pleading is silent on the subject of whether or not
the defendant knew . . . " "Such knowledge cannot be presumed." "Leave to plaintiff
to serve an amended complaint"
In the Browning case knowledge of default was imputed to the trustee. In the
Hazzard case knowledge of the worthlessness of substituted collateral was imputed.
But in neither case did the officer of the trustee who had an opportunity to act in
behalf of bondholders actually receive this knowledge, which would have indicated the
necessity for action, and this was held to negative the charge of wilful default necessary
to lift the general exculpatory clause. The fact, however, that the terms of the
indenture were held to govern to the extent of applying the exculpatory provision in-
dicated that a duty to act upon knowledge was implied, since the indenture specified
no such duty, mid without the imposition of such a duty, and its negligent (but not
wilful) breach, there would be no need of applying the exculpatory provisions.
12. No mention is made of the question of the trustee's knowledge in the two cases
which state in broadest terms that the trustee's duties are confined strictly to the inden-
ture. Benton v. Safe Deposit Bank, Newhall v. Norristown Trust Co., both supra
note 10.
13. Frishmuth v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 95 Fed. 5 (C. C. S.D.N.Y. 1899).
aff'd, 107 Fed. 169 (C. C. A. 2d, 1901); Rhinelander v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co.,
172 N. Y. 519, 65 N. E. 499 (1902); Patterson v. Guardian Trust Co., 144 App. Div.
863, 129 N. Y. Supp. 807 (3d Dep't 1911); Harvey v. Guaranty Trust Co., 134 Misc.
417, 236 N. Y. Supp. 37 (Sup. Ct. 1929). Cf. Conover v. Guarantee Trust Co., 88 N. J.
Eq. 450, 102 At. 844 (CI. 1917); Doyle v. Chatham & Phenix Nat. Bank, 253 N. Y.
369, 171 N. E. 574 (1930) ; Welch v. Northern Bank & Trust Co., 100 Wash. 349, 170
Pac. 1029 (1918) in which the trustee wvas held liable for certifying bonds secured by
collateral which was, at the time of deposit with the trustee, on its face not that speci-
fied in the indenture. as contrasted with Tschetinian v. City Trust Co., 186 N. Y. 432.
79 N. E. 401 (1906) in which the trustee did not know that the mortgage failed to
comply with the indenture at the time the bonds were certified, and was not held liable.
If the trustee decides that inaction will best serve the bondholders' interests, it will
apparently be protected in the exercise of a reasonable discretion. Fleener v. Omaha
National Co., 267 N. NV. 462 (Neb. 1936).
14. See Green v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 223 App. Div. 12, 16, 227 X.Y.
Supp. 252, 257 (1st Dep't 1928), aff'd, 248 N.Y. 627, 162 N. E. 552 (1928). But see
(1932) 41 YALE L. J. 774.
15. Sturges v. Knapp, 31 Vt. 1 (1858) at 54-55: "But after the forfeiture occurs
. . . the duties of the trustees become, not only active and responsible but critical and
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differentiating the grounds upon which duties may be implied after default
from the grounds for implying duties prior to default. Default is a fact
which indicates the necessity for action to protect the interests of bond-
holders. Other facts, no matter when in the life history of the indenture
they ,,ccur, may betray a similar necessity. Knowledge of either type of
fact on the part of the trustee is sufficient ground for implying a duty to
act.' 6
When such a duty has been implied, the general exculpatory clause will
protect the trustee from liability for negligence in not searching out every
possible opportunity for action, but if the agents of the trustee who are in
a position to take action also have knowledge of the facts which give rise
to the duty to act, failure to act is then clearly gross negligence or wilful
default, and the general exculpatory clause offers no protection.17  The
special exculpatory clauses restricting the trustee's duties to action requested
by a specified percentage of bondholders can have no effect where the gen-
eral'exculpatory clause offers no protection, since in such cases they would
limit liability for wilful default, which may not be done under any cir-
cumstances.
1 8
delicate. It is not only a dead, dry trust, but is one of the most active and momentous
responsibility." This statement is echoed, without valuation, in 1 QUINDRY, BONDS AND
BONDHOLDERS (1934) §211; Fowler, supra note 8, at 723; McCollom, supra note 8,
at 1203; Posner, supra note 6, at 203-204. The rule of Sturges v. Knapp was correctly
applied to enable the trustee to act in Guardian Trust Co. v. White Cliffs Portland
Cement & Chalk Co., 109 Fed. 523 (C. C. W. D. Ark. 1901); Hoffman v. First Bond
& Mortgage Co., 116 Conn. 320, 164 AtI. 656 (1933); Cf. Commonwealth v. Susque-
hanna & Del. River R. R., 122 Pa. 306, 15 At. 448 (1888).
16. No case has been found in which there have been imposed upon the trustee,
without knowledge of default, implied duties to act after default. The only case aside
from the instant case in which duties after default are implied is Browning v. Fidelity
Trust Co., 250 Fed. 321 (C. C. A. 3d. 1918). and in it the implied duties are based upon
knowledge. It is of course true that indentures contain comprehensive provisions rele-
vant to default and give trustees extensive powers to act to protect bondholders upon
default [Posner. supra note 8. at 766]: but the mere fact of default does not appear to
be in itself a reason for implying new duties, unless knowledge of that default is brought
home to the trustee.
17. Browning v. Fidelity Trust Co.. Hazzard v. Chase Nat. Bank, both supra
note 9. Application of exculpatory clauses to implied duties may be questioned by
pointing out that such duties are not within the scope of the indenture. Conover v.
Guarantee Trust Co.. Doyle v. Chatham & Phenix Nat. Bank, both supra note 13.
See Harvey v. Guaranty Trust Co., 134 Misc. 417, 425, 236 N.Y. Supp. 37, 50 (Sup.
Ct. 1929). The Browz'ning and Ha=:ard cases are direct holdings against so limiting
the effect of the exculpatory clause. See note 11. supra. Furthermore, the scope of the
indenture theory is of doubtful value. Comment (1933) 33 CoL L. REv. 97. The
argument has been made that all implied duties are actually indenture duties, Posner,
supra note 8. at 788. which would of course render the exculpatory clause applicable.
18. See Browning v. Fidelity Trust Co., 250 Fed. 321, 325 (C. C. A. 3d, 1918);
Posner. supra note 8. 46 YALE L. J. at 763. 781, 783. Notification by a single bondholder
would be sufficient to bring actual knowledge to the trustee. When such knowledge
has reached the trustee, it must apparently act even though no indemnity has been
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Thus the court in the instant case was not faced with the necessity of
choosing between two conflicting lines of decision, but only with the ques-
tion of whether the trustee had both knowledge of the obligor's default,
which would have indicated, the necessity of action and imposed a duty upon
it, and sufficient knowledge of an opportunity to act to bring the case within
the definition of wilful default negatively worked out in the Browning and
Hazzard cases.1 9 Knowledge of the occurrence of the obligor's default was
clear.20 Whether or not the employees of the trustee who knew of default
also had actual knowledge of the existence of attachable assets was not
found as a fact by the court, and the ruling upon this point is somewhat
high-handed. 21 The finding of the trustee's wilful default was not, however,
made the basis of the decision,2 because all exculpatory clauses were held
inapplicable to the duties implied. Since it is probable that the knowledge
which caused these duties to be implied was such as to justify a finding
that the trustee was in wilful default, it is unfortunate that the decision
was not lined up more explicitly on this point with the Browaning and Haz-
zard cases.
The conclusion which may be drawn from this case, and one which seems
consistent with the point of view suggested in earlier cases, is that the most
carefully drawn indenture cannot free a trustee from the duty to act in the
bondholders' interest when it acquires knowledge that there is both a neces-
sity and an opportunity for such action. By protecting the trustee from
liability in the absence of knowledge of the opportunity to act and by limiting
to some extent the imputation of knowledge, exculpatory clauses relieve the
trustee of the burden of constant watchfulness, a limitation justified by the
small fees received by corporate trustees under indentures; but they do not
and cannot condone inactivity once knowledge has been acquired.
provided. Since a court of equity would probably permit reimbursement out of the
trust res, this result does not appear particularly harsh.
19. See note 11, mtpra.
20. See note 1, mpra.
21. "It was not established that there was not someone connected with the defendant
who knew all of these facts, but if it had been, it would in no way relieve it from
liability."
But a finding of wilful default would not seem unreasonable. The trust department
had knowledge of default. The commercial banking department had the attachable
assets of the debtor on deposit, asserted a banker's lien against those deposits to secure
its short term loans to the debtor, and must have been aware of default on the bonds.
See notes 1 and 2, suepra. It seems inconceivable that some responsible officer of the
trustee who could have acted on behalf of the bondholders did not know all these facts
and did not realize the consequences of inaction.
22. See note 5, supra.
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DISPOSITION OF iM\ONEY RECEIVED BY A TRUSTEE FOR CANCELLATION OF A
LEASE EXTENDING BEYOND TIE LIFE EXPECTANCY OF THE BENEFICIARY*
IN 1930 a trustee, as co-owner,' joined in leasing a parcel of land for
forty-eight years at an annual rental of $75,000 plus carrying charges. By
a subsequent agreement the lessee was given permission to raze the building
on the property and erect a new structure within a specified time at a cost
of at least $600.000. After four years, the lessee became so embarrassed
financially that the lessors agreed to cancel the lease upon payment of all
back rent then due, payment of $600,000 as the replacement value of the
building which had been demolished pursuant to the agreement, and pay-
ment of $300,000 as consideration for the cancellation. A disagreement hav-
ing subsequently arisen as to the proper disposition of the $300,000 received
as liquidated damages for the cancellation of the lease, the contingent
remaindermen joined the life beneficiary and the trustee as defendants and
asked the court to construe the will. The court held that, since the trust
estate was an undivided half interest. $150,000 of the amount in dispute
should be paid outright to the owners of the other undivided fifty per cent.
The remaining $150,000, it was ordered, should be divided into forty-four
parts- each part representing one year of the unexpired term of the lease
- with one part to be paid the life beneficiary every year of her life, the
rest to go to the remaindermen on her death. As an alternative, the life
beneficiary was given the privilege of accepting instead of the annual pay-
ments the present cash value of the payments as determined by her life
expectancy based on the American Experience Mortality Tables.
2
The propriety of the apportionment of the $150,000 between the life
beneficiary and the remaindermen depends upon whether the sum received
was a payment of corpus or of income. It is clear that where the corpus
of a trust is impaired by eminent domain proceedings, by fire, or by depre-
ciation or deterioration, any money received as an award,
3 as insurance, 4
>Lang v. Mississippi Valley Trust Co.. Circuit Ct. of St. Louis, Div. 3, No. 5043
(1936).
1. At that time two of the life beneficiaries had died and one-eighth of the trust
e-tate had. in accordance with the terms of the trust, vested absolutely in certain
remaiudermen. Since then a third life beneficiary has died and her three-eighths interest
has vested in the same remaindermen. The trustee thus holds one-half of the property
;, r the surviving life beneficiary and certain contingent remaindermen. Lang v. Mis-
,i-.ippi Valley Trust Co., decree of the Court, p. 9.
2. Lang v. Mississippi Valley Trust Co., Circuit Ct. of St. Louis, Div. 3, No.
5043 (1936).
3. Gibson v. Cooke. 42 Mass. 75 (1840); Allen v. Stewart, 214 Mass. 109, 100
N.E. 1092 (1913): Graham's Estate, 198 Pa. 216, 47 Atl. 1108 (1901); 4 BOGERT,
TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (1935) § 817; RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS (1935) § 233 (b) ; HAND-
BOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COIMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS &
PROCEEDINGS (1931) UNIFORM PRINCIPAL & INCOME Acr §3(2).
4. Horton v. Upham. 72 Conn. 29, 43 Atl. 492 (1899); Graham v. Roberts, 43
N. C. 99 (1851); In re Barron's Will, 163 Wis. 275, 155 N. W. 1087 (1916), see
4 BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 3, § 818; RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS (1935) § 233(b) ; HANDBOOK
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or as damages from a lessee5 is considered a substitute for the destroyed
property and is therefore added to the corpus. Accordingly, it seems clear
in the instant case that the trust estate's one half share of the $600,00
payment received as compensation for damages occasioned by the razing
of the old building should be added to the corpus of the trust. Since the
demolition of this building was the only damage to the corpus and since
the $600,000 presumably compensated in full for that damage,0 it seems
improper to treat the $150,000 paid for the cancellation of the lease also
as corpus. If the latter sum is regarded as a replacement of corpus, the
life beneficiary would be seriously prejudiced, for, instead of receiving the
$37,500 annual rental to which she would have been entitled had the lease
continued, she would obtain approximately $13,500 from the trust pending
the erection and rental of a new building, 7 while at the death of the life
beneficiary the remaindermen would receive the entire $150,000 in addition
to an unimpaired corpus. Since the remaindermen suffer no loss from
vacancy until the death of the life beneficiary and then only if it is im-
possible either to rerent the property at all,8 or to rerent it at the figure
provided for in the cancelled lease, the remittance of $150,000 is likely to
be wholly gratuitous.
It therefore seems more equitable to treat the $150,000 as compensa-
tion for possible loss of future income occasioned by cancellation of the
lease; and, since, the life beneficiary is entitled to trust income, she should
receive any money paid to compensate for reduction in that income. How-
ever, since, in the instant case, the lease would in all probability have
extended beyond the life of the life beneficiary, it may be argued that the
OF THE 'ATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON lNIroawt STATE LAWS & PFo-
CEDLRE (1931) UNIFORMI PRINCIPAL & INCOMIE AL-r §3(2).
5. Dickson v. Allen, 195 S. IV. 698 (Mo. 1917); see 4 Bocmr op. cit. svp-a
note 3, § 819.
6. The original building iad cost approximately $600,000. This was also to be
the cost of the prol s.ed (,-w. Lang v. Mississippi Valley Trust Co., decree of the
Court, pp. 11. 12.
7. The court decreed that one half of the $h03.000. which belonged to the trust
estate, should be held by the trustee as part of the corpus, and that the trustee in his
discretion might erect a building with all or part of it. provided the.owners of the
other one half contributed their share, and that, pending such construction, the
trustee should invest the fund in legal securities. Lang v. Mississippi Valley Trut
Co.. decree of the Court, pp. 13. 14. Thus. $300.000 plus $150.000 at 311 would vil
$13,500 annually. (For convenience all computations are made on the basis of three
per cent.) In addition the life heneficiary would he entitled to any income produced
by the unimproved property. This aggregate sum would he reduced by carrying clarges
such as taxes and insurance, which under the cancelled lease were to be paid by the
lessee.
8. It seems almost certain that the property will become productive again hef..re
the death of the life beneficiary who was fifty-nine years and eight months old when
the lease was cancelled. 1 aug v. Mississippi Valley Trust Co.. decree of the Court.
pp. 16. 17, and who. therefore. had a life expectancy at that time slightly ill excess
of fourteen years according to i1,e American Experience Mortality Tables. See loLFE,
Imh-RITANcE TAX CALCUL'AT10\-Z (1905) 238.
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stni corresponding to future rentals should be apportioned between the life
beneficiary and the remaindermen over the unexpired term,9 a procedure
which would in a reasonably equitable way both distribute the total loss
if the property was not rerented during the period of the lease and appor-
tion the windfall, if the property was immediately rerented at the same or
a slightly altered rental.'
However, neither of these alternatives seems realistic. It is more probable
that the property will remain vacant for a few years and then be rerented.
Should this occur and should the new lease provide for the same rental
as the old and cover a period at least as long, the loss caused by cancel-
lation of the lease would fall entirely on the life beneficiary. Consequently,
it seems inequitable to give a portion of the $150,000 to the remaindermen,
for they would then receive a proportionate share of the fund in addition
to the rent, while the !ife beneficiary would get only slightly more than
$15,000 pending the execution of the new lease.' The $150,000 might
better be regarded as a fund to protect both the life tenant and remainder-
men against actual losses of rent for the period of the cancelled lease. -12
According to this view the $150,000 should be paid to the life beneficiary
in installments equal to the difference between what she would have received
under the old lease and the actual net income produced by the property,13
The remaindermen, it is true, would be prejudiced by such a disposition
of the fund if the property should remain substantially unproductive after
the death of the life beneficiary and the exhaustion of the $150,000, or if
the property should be rerented at a figure lower than that provided for in
9. If the fund were apportioned in this manner, the life beneficiary would receive
annually in addition to the income from the $300,000 fund and the unimproved property
less carrying charges, see note 7 supra, $6,184.47, which is the annuity which $150,000
will purchase for forty-four years, assuming the interest rate is three per cent. If the
life heneficiary should die at the end of her life expectancy of fourteen years, the
remaindermen would be entitled to an annuity for the balance of the forty-four year
period, or approximately thirty years. The present value of such an annuity at that
time would be $121.218.34. For the annuity tables upon which these computations
are based, see MONTGOMERY. FINANCIAL HANDBOOK (2d ed. 1933) 1417-1425.
0. But cf. In re Archambault's Estate, 232 Pa. 347, 81 Att. 315 (1911) (cash
bonus paid by lessee to procure cancellation of a lease four years prior to its termina-
tion and the execution of a new one to run for ten years held income belonging to the
life heneficiary). And see note 15, infra.
11. See note 9. sunpra.
12. It is arguable that, since the $150.000 is a species of income, the entire amount
.hould be paid the life beneficiary at once. See Dickson v. Allen. 195 S. W. 698, 701
(Mo. 1917). stating that ordinarily money in excess of back rent and taxes received
by a trustee for cancelling a lease should be regarded as income belonging to the life
beneficiary. Cf. In re Archambault's Estate, 232 Pa. 347, 81 Atl. 315 (1911).
13. Pending the construction of a building, the life beneficiary will receive $9,000
from the $300,000 fund plus any income realized from the unimproved property less
carrying charges, see note 7, supra. Thus the $150,000 would be sufficient to insure
payment of an undiminished income of $37,500 annually to the life beneficiary for ap-




the cancelled lease and there was a similar exhaustion of the fund.1 4 How-
ever, so to distribute the money would seem consistent with the growing
tendency to favor the life beneficiary rather than the remaindermen in
disputes over the proper allocation of funds received by a trustee of un-
productive property. 15 The fact that, in the instant case, the life beneficiary
was specifically named in the will and was the immediate object of the
testatrix's bounty, while the remaindermen cannot be ascertained until the
happening of a remote contingency seems to furnish additional justification
for such a result.
DUTY OF AN ILLEGITIMATE CHILD TO SUPPORT ITS DESTITUTE MOTHER*
THE Domestic Relations Court Act of the City of New York provides:
"The parents, the grandparents, the children and the grandchildren of a
dependent adult . . . are . . . chargeable with the support of such poor
relative." 1 Relying on this provision, ali indigent woman filed a petition in
the Domestic Relations Court to obtain reasonable support from her ille-
gitimate son. Despite a long-standing rule of construction that the words
"child" and "children" in the body of a statute refer to legitimates only,-
2
14. If the property were rerented before the exhaustion of the $150,000, a pro-
portionate share of the undistributed balance might well be set aside for the remainder-
men. If the new lease provided for rent equal to or in excess of that provided for
in the cancelled lease, the remaindermen would thus share in the windfall occasioned
by the cancellation. If the new rental were less, the injury to the remaindermen would
be compensated for at least in part.
15. See 4 BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 3, §§ 825-827; Brandis, Trust Administration:
Apportionment of Proceeds of Sale of Unproductive Land and* of Expenses (1931)
9 N. C. L. REV. 127, and authorities there cited. The Uniform Principal and Income
Act provides that where the trustee is under a duty to sell unproductive property and
such sale is delayed to avoid a sacrifice, the life tenant is entitled to share in the net
proceeds received when the sale is effectuated, provided the proceeds exceed the in-
ventory value of the property. HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF Cont-
MISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS & PROCEEnDIGS (1931) UNIroR PRINCIPAL &
INcomE AcT § 11. At present at least two states have enacted this statute. O. CODE
ANN. (Supp. 1935) § 63-1211: V,%. CODE (Michie, 1936) § 5133m. For a similar pro-
vision see RESTATEMENT. TRUSTS (1935) §§240-241. It would seem especially desirable
to pay the life beneficiary an undiminished income pending the rerental of the property
in the instant case, since power to sell the property' is denied the trustee by the wvill.
Lang v. Mississippi Valley Trust Co.. decree of the Court, p. &
*Lee v. Smith, 161 Misc. 43, 291 N. Y. Supp. 47 (Dom. Rel. CL N. Y. 1936).
1. N. Y. Laws 1933, c. 482, § 101, subdivision 4.
2. Dickinson v. North Eastern Ry. Co., 2 H. & C. 735 (Ex. 1863); McDonald
v. Pittsburgh, C., C. & St L. Ry. Co., 144 Ind. 459, 43 N. E. 447 (1896) : Bell v. Terry
& Tench Co., 177 App. Div. 123, 163 N. Y. Supp. 733 (3d Dept 1917); Splitdorf
Electrical Co. v. King, 90 N. J. L. 421, 103 At. 674 (Sup. Ct. 1917): 5 Am. & ENC.
Excyc. OF LAW 1095: see Note (1924) 30 A. L R. 1075. But cf. State v. Scarbrough.
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the court held that the provision imposed a duty even on illegitimates, and
ordered the bastard son to support the petitioner.
3
The decision is not completely without precedent. Drawing on the civil
law,4 Scotland's Court of Session reached the same result in 1886,r but the
case was subsequently overruled by the House of Lords.0 At common law,
the bastard was considered "nobody's child," and had no family rights against
either ascendants or collaterals. 7 Not even his mother had a duty to sup-
port him, and he was thrown on the parish at birth.8 Although the belief
that illicit intercourse could be discouraged by punishing the child was not
repudiated, 9 fiscal policy led to the enactment of the Poor Law of 1576,10
which placed the duty of maintaining the bastard upon both natural parents.
Since then, the trend of statute and decision has been to liberate the ille-
gitimate child from the restrictions, which distinguished him from the legiti-
mate. Rights of inheritance, for instance, are now allowed to some extent
in all states." The usual statutory provision permits inheritance by an ille-
gitimate from his mother,' 2 and many states allow him to take by representa-
tion from her kindred ;13 several states allow inheritance from full and half-
108 W. Va. 9, 150 S. E. 219 (1929) (the word "child" in the title of a statute held to
include illegitimate child when the body of the statute expressly included it).
3. Lee v. Smith, 161 Misc. 43, 291 N. Y. Supp. 47 (Dom. Rel. Ct. N. Y., 1936).
4. D. 25.3.5.4: "We will compel the mother to support her children, especially
her bastard children, and her children we will compel to support her."
5. Samson v. Davie. 14 Sess. Cas. (Rettie) 113 (Court of Session 1886).
6. Clarke v. Carfin Coal Co., [18911 A. C. 412 (H. L.), followed in Clement
v. Bell & Sons, 1 Sess. Cas. (Fraser) 924, 36 Scot. L. R. 725 (Court of Session 1899).
7. 1 BL. Comm. *459; 1 SCHOULER, MARRIAGE, DIvoRcE, SEPARATION AND DomESTIC
RELATIONS (6th ed. 1921) § 704; TIFFANY, DOMESTIC RELATIOS (3d ed. 1921) § 114;
see Comment (1932) 45 HARV. L. REV. 890, 891.
8. Robbins and De~ik. The Familial Property Rights of Illegitimate Children: A
Comparati'e Study (1930) 30 Co!.. L. REV. 308, 317.
9. See I BL. Comt.t. '455: Clarke v. Carfin Coal Co., [18911 A. C. 412, 427-428
(H. L.).
10. 18 Eliz. c. 3 (1576).
11. 4 VERNIER. A.FRICAN FAM-\I1LY LAWS (1936) § 249, where all the statutes are
collected and digested. Vernier excludes Louisiana from his list, but even that state
allows an acknowledged illegitimate to inherit from his mother in the absence of lawful
issue [LA. CiV. CODE A.NN. (Dart. 1932) art. 918], and from his father if the latter
left no lawful kindred. LA. Civ. CODE A-N,. (Dart, 1932) art. 919. The courts have
been liberal in finding an "acknowledgment." Succession of Corsey, 171 La. 663,
131 So. 841 (1931) ; Taylor v. Allen, 151 La. 82, 91 So. 635 (1922).
12. 4 VERNIER, 10c. cit. supra note 11. The cases are collected in Notes (1923)
24 A. L. R. 570, 572, (1933) 83 A. L. R. 1330, 1331.
In Connecticut, the right to inherit from and through the mother was accorded the
illegitimate by judicial decision in the absence of statutes. Heath v. White, 5 Conn.
228 (1824); Dickinson's Appeal, 42 Conn. 491 (1875).
13. Gregley v. Jackson, 38 Ark. 487 (1882); Morrow v. Morrow, 289 Ill. 135,
124 N. E. 386 (1919); Parks v. Kimes, 100 Ind. 148 (1885); Lawton v. Lane, 92 Me.
170, 42 At. 352 (1898); Moore v. Moore, 169 Mo. 432, 69 S.W. 278 (1902); see
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brothers and sisters,' 4 and succession to the father is frequently possible.' 5
Likewise, the bastard's rights with respect to support and education have
been extended. Statutes in almost all jurisdictions require the mother to
maintain the illegitimate, and provide means for compelling the father to
contribute to its support.' The Uniform Illegitimacy Act, now adopted by
seven states,' 7 requires both parents to support their illegitimate children and
makes the father liable for the expenses of the mother's confinement.18 Full
equality of rights for illegitimates is provided only in Arizona and North
Dakota,19 where illegitimacy has been abolished by statutes providing that
one who is born out of wedlock is nevertheless the child of his natural
parents, with all the rights and duties normally included in that relation-
ship.
20
Advancement in the law concerning the rights of illegitimates has been
paralleled by the development of requirements compelling legitimates to
provide for destitute relatives. The common law imposed no duty to pro-
vide for parents, no matter how needy.2 ' The duty was created, however,
4 VFRER, lc. cit. supra note 11. Contra: Williams v. Kimball, 35 Fla. 49, 16 So. 783
(1895); Thigpen v. Thigpen, 136 Ga. 541, 71 *S. E. 790 (1911); Reynolds v. Hitchcock,
72 N. H. 340, 56 Atl. 745 (1903); Re Mericlo, 63 How. Pr. 62 (N.Y. 1882) ; Wilson
v. Wilson, 189 N. C. 85, 126 S. E. 181 (1925).
14. Morrow v. Morrow, 289 Ill. 135, 124 N.E. 386 (1919); Stevenson v. Wash-
ington, 231 Ky. 233, 21 S. IV. (2d) 274 (1929); Messer v. Jones, 88 Me. 349, 34 AtL
177 (1896).
15. Martinez v. Mendez, 256 Fed. 596 (C. C. A. 1st, 1919); In re Jones' Estate,
192 Iowa 78, 182 N. W. 27 (1921); Smith v. Smith, 105 Kan. 294, 182 Pac. 538
(1919) ; see Notes (1923) 24 A. L. R. 570, 587, (1933) 83 A. L. R. 1330, 1336.
16. 4 VzRNIa, AmzxwcAx FAmY LAws (1936) § 250.
17. Iowa, Nev., N.1f., N.Y., N.D., S.D., Wyo. Of these, New Mexico and
New York have made considerable changes. The citations are collected in 9 U. L. A.
186, where the Act in full may be found.
18. UNIFORM ILLEGrtlmAcY Acr § 1.
19. ARIz. Rv. CoDE ANN. (Struckmeyer, 1928) §§273-285; N. D. ComP. LAWs
ANN. (Supp. 1925) §§ 10500bl-10500b3. There is some question whether the general
legitimating act is still in effect in North Dakota, since it may be contended that
enactment of the Uniform Illegitimacy Act repealed the earlier legislation. It has been
strenuously argued, however, that the two acts are not conflicting. 4 VERNI1ER, AMERIcAN
FAMILY LAws (1936) p. 176, n. 3.
20. European systems have similarly tended to lower the ancient restrictions. The
most advanced law, Norway's, gives the bastard the full rights of a legitimate child.
See MIAGNusso.N, NORWEGIAN LAN%, OF ILLEGITIMACY (1918) U. S. Dep't of Labor,
Children's Bureau, Leg. Ser. No. 1, Pub. No. 31. In France, however, inheritance
depends upon filiation proceedings, and even when parenthood is proved, the bastard
takes less than a legitimate child. CIVIL CoDE. art. 756 et seq. Under the German code
he occupies the position of a legitimate as to his mother and her relatives [Cvui Cos,,
§ 1705], and on petition to the government may be declared legitimate as to the father
also, with all consequent rights and duties. CIVIL CODE §§ 1723, 1736.
21. See Duffy v. Yordi, 149 Cal. 140, 84 Pac. 838 (1906); In re Erickson, 104
Kan. 521, 180 Pac. 263 (1919); Edwards v. Davis, 16 Johns. 281 (N.Y. 1819); 1
SCHOULER, op. cit. .nipra note 7, § 739. By statute the grandparents, parents and children
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in all but eleven American jurisdictions by civil and criminal statutes.22
Grandchildren, grandparents, brothers and sisters have also been given re-
ciprocal obligations in some states.
3 There is even an incipient tendency to
require the wife to support her dependent husband.
2 4
The instant decision seems a justifiable extension of these two converging
lines of development. The court's construction of the statute as including
illegitimate children appears consistent both with the purpose of the legis-
lature to shift the burden of supporting indigent adults from the taxpayers
to financially capable blood relatives of the poor, and with the tendency to
giVe bastards the legal status of legitimates-a tendency which, if not carried
out to impose duties as well as rights, would favor bastards over legitimate
children.
2 5
ESCHEAT OF -MONEY WITHIN THE CONTROL OF A FEDERAL COURT*
IN SATISFACTION of a judgment secured by certain bondholders in a repre-
sentative suit, a railroad company deposited a sum of money in the registry of
the Federal District Court for Eastern Pennsylvania. After five years, the un-
claimed residue of this fund was transferred to the credit of the United
States pursuant fb a federal statute' which provides for a refund of the
money to persons who can establish title thereto in the district court. Sub-
sequently the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, by its Escheator, petitioned
the court for an order directing payment of the money as an escheat to the
state. The federal court denied the petition on the ground that the common-
wealth had no title to the fund and could not establish title by an escheat
of an indigent person were charged with his support in England. 43 Eliz. c. 2, § VII
(1601). Blackstone notes that the case of spurious issue is an exception. 1 BL. CoIM.
*454. While expressly stating that a bastard has no duty to support his father, the
passage is open to contradictory inferences as to a duty towards the mother.
22. 4 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAmILY LAWS (1936) §235.
23. Ibid. Under the legislation involved in the instant case, Justice Panken has held
that an estranged husband is liable for the support of his wife's illegitimate child, where
the husband was aware of the child's existence at the time of the marriage. Jones
v. Jones, Domestic Relations Court of the City of New York, N. Y. Herald-Tribune,
Jan. 11, 1937. p. 30, col. 6. An Austrian court has held that a man is liable for the
support of his illegitimate half-brother. Hahn v. Hohenberg, N. Y. Times, Dec. 6, 1936,
§ 1, p. 36, col. 5.
24. See Apostle v. Pappas, 154 Misc. 497. 500-502, 277 N. Y. Supp. 400, 404-405
(Sup. Ct. 1935), (1935) 35 COL. L. REv. 783 (wife said to be under duty to pay reason-
able funeral expenses of deceased husband).
25. In those states where the illegitimate's rights are still restricted, it would seem
fair to limit his duties proportionally. It should be noted that in New York, the bastard
can inherit only from his mother (N. Y. DECEDENTS' ESTATES LAW §83(13)], yet the
court's interpretation of the Domestic Relations Court Act in the instant case would
render him liable for the support even of paternal grandparents.
*Appeal of Commonwealth, by Klein, 186 Atl. 600 (Pa. 1936).
1. 36 STAT. 1083 (1911), 28 U. S. C. §852 (1934).
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action in a federal court, apparently for want of federal jurisliction.2 A
petition was then filed in a lower state court to obtain a decree of escheat
in order to establish title. This petition was denied on motion of the United
States District Attorney. A statute 3 was then specially enacted to provide
for such an action, and an amended petition was filed, but it %was again dis-
missed on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction to declare the
escheat. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed the hold-
ing of the lower court, and the case was remanded for entry of a decree.
4
The power of a state to appropriate property abandoned within its borders
was viewed at common law as an incident of tenure5 but was later considered
simply an attribute of sovereignty.0 In England, when a landowner died
intestate and without heirs, title to the land therefore escheated to the
crown, either by entry or by Inquest of Office; T and this prerogative ex-
tended to personalty under the doctrine of bona vacentia.8 In this country,
2. Unless the escheat action in the federal court could be considered as merely
ancillary to the original suit against the railroad [cf. Byers v. McAuley, 149 U. S. 608,
618, 619 (1893)], the court clearly had no jurisdiction. The federal judicial power
given in the Constitution does not extend to- suits by a state against its own citizens
[DomIE, FEDERAL PROCEDURE (1928) 530] even though citizens of other states are in-
cluded as parties defendant. California v. Southern Pacific Co., 157 U. S. 229 (1895).
The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction of suits at law and in equity between a
state and citizens of another state. U. S. CoNsT. Art. III, §2, c. 1. A statute could
give similar jurisdiction to the inferior federal courts, but no such statute exists. See
Plaquemines Fruit Co. v. Henderson, 170 U. S. 511, 516 (1898); United States v.
California, 297 U. S. 175, 187 (1936). In any event, the constitutional grant of power
over suits at law and in equity might not include statutory actions of escheat. A probate
proceeding is not "a suit of a civil nature at law or in equity" within the meaning of
the Judiciary Acts. See 2 HUGHEs, FEDERAL PRAcTicE (1931) §985. The judicial
power does not extend to criminal actions between a state and citizens of another state.
Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co. of New Orleans, 127 U. S. 265 (838); cf. Milwaukee
County v. White Co., 296 U. S. 268 (1935).
In the proceeding in the federal court under discussion, the state relied upon a
state statute purporting to confer jurisdiction on the federal court. Of course such a
statute cannot enlarge the power of the federal courts. Vhitehead v. Shattuck, 138
U. S. 146 (1891).
3. PA. STAT. (Purdon, 1936) tit. 27. § 41.
4. Appeal of Commonwealth, by Klein. 186 Atl. 600 (Pa. 1936), (1936) 85 U. or
PA. I REv. 109.
5. POLLOCK & MAITLAND. TimE HISTORY OF ENGLISit LAw (2d ed. 1905) b. II,
c. 1, § 11; see Doe v. Redfern, 12 East. 96. 104 (K. B. 1810).
6. See cases cited infra, notes 7 and 8. Escheat in the feudal sense existed in a
few of the colonies. See Bassett, Landholding in Colonial North Carolina (1895) 11
L. Q. REv. 154, 161. But this conception of escheat has not prevailed since the revo-
lution. See Matthews v. Ward, 10 Gill & J. 443, 451 (.Md. 1839) ; Vallace v. Harmsted,
44 Pa. 492, 499 (1864).
7. Burgess v. Wheate, 1 Black V. 123 (K. B. 1759) ; see Dyke v. Walford, 5 Moo.
P. C. C. 434, 459 (1846); (1919) 18 MicH. I- REv. 226, 227; (1934) 20 VA. L REV.
913. The Inquest of Office was a proceeding in rein. See Hamilton v. Brown, 161 U. S.
256, 263 (1895).
8. Dyke v. Walford, 5 Moo. P. C. C. 434 (1846); In re Bond (1901) 1 Ch. 15.
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the state rather than the federal government is considered sovereign for
such purposes,9 and its power of escheat will generally include both realty
and personalty, although legislative authorization is probably essential to
validate an escheat of personalty.' 0 Escheat statutes covering both realty
and personalty have been enacted in almost all states. In the case of person-
alty, these statutes usually relate to specific types of property, such as
unclaimed deposits in banks," funds in the hands of fiduciaries, 1 2 or dis-
tributive shares of dissolved corporations. 1 3 Although a few provide that
an escheat shall take place automatically on the happening of certain con-
tingencies, 14 they generally require a judicial proceeding to ascertain whether
an escheat has occurred.'3 In such proceedings, the escheat is effected by
an adjudication that the property has remained unclaimed for a specified
period of time, followed by a decree Vesting title to the property in the
state.1 6 But in order that all outstanding interests in the property may thus
9. An escheat by the federal government is generally held to be void. American
Loan & Trust Co. v. Grand Rivers Co., 159 Fed. 775 (C. C. W. D. Ky. 1908), (1908)
67 CENT. L. J. 429. But cf. In re Moneys in Registry of District Court, 170 Fed. 470
(E. D. Pa. 1909). In the case of territories, however, the federal government is con-
sidered as parens patriae for purposes of escheat. Mormon Church v. United States,
136 U. S. 1 (1889); cf. Territory of Alaska v. First Nat'l Bank, 22 F. (2d) 377
(C. C. A. 9th, 1927).
10. See Hamilton v. Brown, 161 U. S. 256, 263 (1895); American Loan & Trust
Co. v. Grand Rivers Co., 159 Fed. 775, 780 (C. C. W. D. Ky. 1908). No case has been
found, however, in which statutory authorization has not been present. Cf. Shanks v.
Board of Education, 221 Ky. 470, 298 S. W. 1111 (1927) ; Alton's Estate, 220 Pa.
258, 69 Atl. 902 (1908) ; Robinson v. State, 87 S. W. (2d) 297 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935).
11. Statutes providing for the escheat of unclaimed bank deposits are common,
and have been held to be constitutional. Provident Savings Institution v. Malone,
221 U. S. 660 (1910): Security Savings Bank v. California, 263 U. S. 282 (1923);
Commonwelth v. Dollar Savings Bank, 259 Pa. 138, 102 Ati. 569 (1917) ; see 5
ZOLL.MIAN. BANKS AND BANKING (Perm. ed. 1936) §3548.
12. See. e.g.. ILL. REV. STAT. (1935) c. 49, §2; PA. STAT. (Purdon, 1936) tit.
72, § 1314; In re Advance Beneficial Orders' Assigned Estate, 48 Pa. Super. 197 (1911)
Appsley's Estate, 8 Pa. D. & C. 265 (1926).
13. MINN. STAT. (Mason, 1927) §7642; PA. STAT. (Purdon, 1936) tit. 15, §551;
cf. ARiz. CONST. art. XI, §8; ILL.. REV. STAT. (1935) c. 141, § 5; Wis. STAT. (1931)
§§ 59.89, 59.90; In re Hull Copper Co., 50 P. (2d) 560 (Ariz. 1935), (1935) 45 YALE
L. J. 720.
14. In re Melrose, 234 N. Y. 48. 136 N. E. 235 (1922), 23 A. L. R. 1233 (1923);
Miles v. Metzger. 316 Pa. 211, 173 Atl. 285 (1934). Robinson v. State,.87 S. W. (2d)
297 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935).
15. Shanks v. Board of Education, 221 Ky. 470, 298 S. W. 1111 (1927) ; Brooklyn
Borough Gas Co. v. Bennett. 154 Misc. 106, 277 N. Y. Supp. 203 (Sup. Ct. 1935);
Dutton v. Donahue, 44 Wyo. 52, 8 P. (2d) 90 (1932).
16. Historically. the validity of a declaration of escheat depended on proof that the
former owner of the property had died without heirs. See Hamilton v. Brown, 161 U. S.
256, 267 (1895). This view still prevails in some states. Moore v. Eastman Lumber
Co., 156 Miss. 359, 126 So. 44 (1930) ; cf. Territory of Alaska v. First Nat'l Bank,
41 F. (2d) 186 (C. C. A. 9th, 1930). But the death of the former owner is no longer
generally regarded as a prerequisite to the validity of the escheat [Provident Savings
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be cut off without personal service upon possible claimants, the proceeding
must be one of the type often described as in ren,zr a fact which raises juris-
dictional problems.
The rules which purport to determine when an action in rem may properly
be entertained are both vague and inconsistent. But while the cases cannot
be satisfactorily reconciled, the requirements for jurisdiction in rein, using
the phrase in a broad sense,' 8 can most nearly be explained in terms of the
following set of propositions. First, on familiar grounds of territorial juris-
diction, the res must be within the physical boundaries of the state.'9 Second,
the court must have sufficient control over the res to make its decree effec-
tive.2 0 Although the methods of acquiring the requisite control may differ
considerably in the various types of actions in rein,2 ' the amount of control
necessary in any particular case apparently depends on the nature of the
Institution v. Malone, 221 U. S. 660 (1910); State v. First Nat. Bank of Portland.
61 Ore. 551, 123 Pac. 712 (1912) ] although reliance is sometimes placed on the pre-
sumptive death which arises from prolonged absence. Cunnius v. Reading School Dist.,
198 U. S. 458 (1904); Germantown Trust Co. v. Powell, 265 Pa. 71, 108 At. 441
(1919).
17. Hamilton v. Brown, 161 U. S. 256 (1895); Brooklyn Borough Gas Co. v.
Bennett, 154 Misc. 106, 277 N. Y. Supp. 203 (Sup. Ct. 1935). In an action involving
the escheat of bank deposits, it has been suggested that the proceeding was in rei as to
unknown claimants, quasi in rein as to depositors, and in personam as to the bank. See
Security Savings Bank v. California, 263 U. S. 282, 287 (1923).
18. Conceptually, actions in rein are limited to proceedings directly against a res.
Cf. The Lottowanna, 20 Wall. 201 (U. S. 1873). Hence adjudications of rights more
or less collateral to the res are not strictly in ren, even though the res may constitute
the jurisdictional basig of the proceeding. Cf. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714 (1877)
(attachment); Harris v. Balk, 198 U. S. 215 (1905) (garnishment); Pennington v.
Fourth Nat. Bank, 243 U. S. 269 (1917) (division of property in divorce proceedings);
see 1 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS (5th ed. 1925) § 347; 1 BL.LE, Co.N-FUcr oF LAws (1935)
§ 102.1. Because of the fetish that equity acts only in personat,:, it is sometimes said
that an equitable proceeding for the removal of a cloud from title is not a genuine
action in rem. See Arndt v. Griggs, 134 U. S. 316, 322 (1889); 3 FaEtA., supra
§ 1521. It is now generally recognized, however, that equity may under certain circum-
stances act in rein. See Note (1937) 50 HARv. L REv. 495. The term i rem as used
herein" will include all actions in which a particular piece of property is the basis of
jurisdiction.
19. See 1 FREEMAN, op. cit. stpra note 18, at 674. The limitations of territorial
jurisdiction have been applied in actions of escheat. In re Lyon's Estate. 175 'Wash.
115. 26 P. (2d) 615 (1933), (1934) 47 HARV. L. Rzv. 872.
20. Holmes v. Holmes, 283 Fed. 453 (E. D. Mich. 1922); Franz v. Franz, 15 F.
(2d) 797 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926); Shipley v. Shipley, 187 Iowa 1295, 175 N. V. 51 (1919).
21. In actions at law, seizure by attachment is the accepted method by which a
court obtains control over tangible property. Friedenstein v. United States, 125 U. S.
224 (1888); Delta Ins. Co. v. Interstate Fire Ins. Co., 113 Miss. 542, 74 So. 420
(1917). But in proceedings in equity, other devices are more generally employed. Cf.
cases cited infra, notes 24, 25, 26; Note (1937) 50 HARv. L. Rsv. 495; Legis. (1936)
11 Wis. L. REv. 401. The practical results of these various methods would seem to be
substantially the same. Cf. Holmes v. Holmes, 283 Fed. 453 (E. D. Mich. 192);
Benner v. Benner, 63 Ohio St. 220, 58 N. E. 569 (1900).
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property involved. Thus, in actions concerning movable personalty, seizure
prior to the commencement of the proceeding is sometimes considered essen-
tial to jurisdiction :22 but other devices deemed equivalent to seizure may
also serve, and where the person in possession of the res has been personally
served in the action,2 3 or enjoined from removing the property beyond the
court's territorial jurisdiction, 24 or where a receiver has been appointed, 2
or the property is suhject to a lien, 26 seizure for purposes of control becomes
a needless formality. On the other hand, where the property is immovable,
neither seizure nor its equivalents are essential to jurisdiction. Normally,
a court has potential control over all property, whether realty or personalty,
permanently situated within its territorial jurisdiction, and if the property
in question is sufficiently designated in the pleadings, this potential control
will afford an adequate jurisdictional basis for a proceeding in rem.27 This
rule is of course subject to the limitation imposed under principles of comity
that if the property is already the subject of an action in rem in another
court, the latter court has exclusive control over the res, and no other court
will exercise jurisdiction.28 Finally, in order to determine the rights of ab-
22. In re Forsyth, 78 Fed. 296 (N. D. Cal. 1897); Ely v. Hartford Life Ins. Co.,
123 Ky. 799, 110 S. W. 265 (1928); Waldock v. Atkins, 60 Okla. 38, 158 Pac. 587
(1916) ; Bank of Centerville v. Gelhaus, 60 S. D. 31, 242 N. W. 642 (1932).
23. Harris v. Balk, 198 U. S. 215 (1905) (garnishment); Security Savings Bank
v. California, 263 U. S. 282 (1923) (escheat of bank deposits); Shipley v. Shipley, 187
Iowa 1295, 175 N. W. 51 (1919) (division of property in separation proceedings).
24. Pennington v. Fourth Nat. Bank, 243 U. S. 269 (1917) (action awarding ali-
mony from savings account) ; Franz v. Franz, 15 F. (2d) 797 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926)
(action to quiet title to securities) ; Cleveland & Buffalo Transit Co. v. Beeman, 12
Ohio C. C. 460 (1909), aff'd. 61 Ohio St. 509, 91 N. E. 1126 (1909) (corporation erl-
joined from transferring its stock in alimony proceedings).
25. Murray v. Murray. 115 Cal. 266, 47 Pac. 37 (1896) (action for alimony in
separation proceedings) : cf. President of Bowdoin College v. Merritt, 59 Fed. 6 (N. D.
Cal. 1893) (action to quiet title to land).
26. Holmes v. Holmes. 283 Fed. 453 (E. D. Mich. 1922) (foreclosure of a judg-
ment lien): Batjhr v. Roberts, 148 S. W. 841 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912) (foreclosure of
a mortgage) ; Orange County v. Jenkins, 200 N. C. 202, 156 S. E. 774 (1931) (fore-
closure of a tax lien).
27. Arndt v. Griggs, 134 U. S. 316 (1889) (action to quiet title to land) ; Hamilton
v. Brown. 161 U. S. 256 (1895) (escheat of realty) ; Hook v. Hoffman, 16 Ariz. 540,
147 Pac. 722 (1915) (action to quiet title to shares of stock) ; Wesner v. O'Brien,
56 Kan. 724. 54 Am. Rep. 604 (1896) (division of real property in divorce proceed-
ings) ; Tyler v. Court of Registration, 175 Mass. 71, 55 N. E. 812 (1900) (proceedings
for the registration of titles) : see 3 FREEMAN. op. cit. supra note 18, at 2850. But cf.
Note (1937) 50 HARv. L. REv. 495. 496. In certain legal actions "in rein", however,
where the ownership of the property is determined by the adjudication of claims also
enforceable in personam, seizure is required even though the property is immovable.
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714 (1877) (action to collect debt out of real property).
The decision in Pennoyer v. .Neff can perhaps be interpreted as requiring seizure merely
to ensure adequate notice to interested parties. See infra note 29, and accompanying
text.
28. Covell v. Heyman, 111 U. S. 176 (1884); United States v. Bank of N. Y.,
296 U. S. 463 (1936). Nor is it material whether the court of prior jurisdiction has
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sentee parties in an action in rem, "due process of law" requires that such
parties be notified of the proceedings. Originally, the requirements of notice
could be satisfied only by seizure of the res, the notion being that all persons
interested in the property would be immediately aware of the seizure.P But,
as in other cases where the due process clause demands the giving of notice,
only that notice which is reasonable and practical is now required, and since
the courts have recognized the inadequacy of the fiction of notice through
seizure, service by publication will ordinarily suffice.3 0
An attempt to justify the instant decision in terms of these rules involves.
considerable difficulty. In the first place, there is some doubt as to whether
the res was within the territorial jurisdiction of the Pennsylvania court. If,
for purposes of the case, it is considered as having been in the Federal
Treasury, it was of course outside the borders of the state, and the state
court could have had no power to issue its decree. 3t Since the transfer from
the federal court registry to the National Treasury was a bookkeeping trans-
action, it might be argued that the fund still had a "situs" in the local national
bank, but an obstacle would then arise in that national banks have been
held immune from escheat as federal instrumentalities,32 The decision can
be supported only on the theory that the money was still within the control
of the federal court,3 3 and therefore might be given a situs within the state
comparable to the situs attributed to a debt in a garnishment proceeding"
or to the business situs conferred on intangibles in cases of taxation 3 5 Under
actual possession of the res. Zimmerman v. So Relle, 80 Fed. 417 (C. C. A. 8th, 1897) ;
Dennison Brick & Tile Co. v. Chicago Trust Co., 286 Fed. 818 (C. C. A. 6th, 1923);
Franz v. Franz, 15 F. (2d) 797 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926).
29. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714 (1877) ; see 3 FazM, op. cit. supra note 18,
at 3140. An injunction forbidding the person in possession to dispose of property also
operates as notice. Benner v. Benner, 63 Ohio St. 220, 58 N. B. 569 (1900).
30. See cases cited supra note 27. Even in cases where seizure is essential, service
by publication is usually required as well. Hassall v. Wilcox, 130 U. S. 493 (1889);
Thompson v. Thompson, 226 U. S. 551 (1912). But cf. Brooklyn Borough Gas Co.
v. Bennett, 154 Misc. 106, 277 N. :. Supp. 203 (Sup. Ct. 1935).
31. See note 19, supra.
32. First Nat'l Bank of San Jose v. California, 262 U. S. 366 (1923) ; cf. Columbia
Nat'l Bank v. Powell, 265 Pa. 85, 108 Atl. 445 (1919). But cf. Territory of Alaska
v. First Nat'l Bank, 41 F. (2d) 186 (C. C. A. 9th, 1930); State v. First Nat'l Bank of
Portland, 61 Ore. 551, 123 Pac. 712 (1912); (1936) 11 AVis. L REv. 401.
33. The court apparently considered the action as in personamn and thereby circum-
vented the various limitations upon actions in ren. But such an interpretation would
render the proceeding invalid as to the absentee bondholders, who were not personally
served. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714 (1877). And although the court relied on
Security Savings Bank v. California, 263 U. S. 282 (1923), [see supra note 17], this
case would be relevant only if the action had been directed against the federal court
itself.
34. In garnishment proceedings the res is considered to be a debt having a situs
wherever the debtor is found. Harris v. Balk, 198 U. S. 215 (1905). In the instant
case, the res might therefore be given a situs within the state, since the debt was
p ayable out of the federal court.
35. Cf. Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Fox, 298 U. S. 193 (1936); see Lowndes, Spurious
Conceptions of the Constitutional Law of Taxation (1934) 47 HAv. L REv. 628, 638.
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that view, it was unecessarv for the state court to obtain control of the
fund through seizure or its equivalents, since the situs of the money could be
considered as permanently within the state.3 6 The chief difficulty encountered
by such a theory is that it places the state court in the position of adjudi-
cating upon property already within the control of the federal court.3 7 But
the principles of cdmity which are said to forbid action of this sort were
devised solely to prevent conflicts between courts in the settlement of con-
troversies.38 1 lere such a conflict would be impossible, since the federal court
held the money merely as a stakeholder, and was not attempting to determine
title -to the property itself. If the rules of comity are considered to have no
proper application to this case, there would seem to be sufficient jurisdictional
basis for the decision, since the constitutional requirements of notice were
satisfied by service through publication on the absentee bondholders.3 9
PROTECTION OF THE WIDOW'S STATUTORY SHARE BY RESTRICTING
INTER Vivos TRANSFERS OF THE HUSBAND*
A FEW MONTHS before death a husband gave to his children by a former
marriage a substantial part of his estate, consisting of realty, bank accounts,
and shares bf stock: but he retained a life interest in all the property.' His
widow brought an action upon his death to set aside the transfers, alleging
they were without consideration and were fraudulently made to defeat her
statutory right to share in his estate at death. In this case under the New
York Decedent Estate' statute,2 the court held on motion to dismiss for
failure to state a cause of action that the retention of a life estate coupled
with the "sole purpose" to defeat the widow's interest constituted a fraudulent
attempt to evade the provisions of the statute, and permitted the widow to
share in the property which her husband had attempted to give to his chil-
dren. One judge dissented on the ground that the statute gave the widow
a share only in her husband's estate at his death and could not inhibit the
36. See cases cited supra note 27.
37. See cases cited supra note 28. Funds paid into a court registry are not subject
to attachment prior to actual payment to the persons entitled thereto. Bucher v. Vance,
36 F. (2d) 774 (C. C. A. 7th, 1929).
38. See Pennsylvania Gen'l Casualty Co. v. Commonwealth, 294 U. S. 189, 195
(1934): Ward v. Foulkrod, 264 Fed. 627, 631 (C. C. A. 3d, 1920).
39. See cases cited smpra note 27.
*Bodner v. Feit. 247 App. Div. 119, 286 N. Y. Supp. 814 (Ist Dep't 1936).
1. The allegations ot the complaint are not clear either as to the quality or the
quantity of the estate reserved by the husband, but the retention of a life estate by
the husband seems to be a plausible interpretation of the complaint. Approximately
60% was conveyed by ab'solute transfer, and the balance, representing monies on deposit
in banks, by means of a "Totten Trust" of which the husband retains not only a life
estate but also the power of revocation. Communication to the Yale Law Journal from
counsel for defendants, Feb. 2. 1937. See note 12, infra.
2. N. Y. DECEDENT ESTATE LAW § 18.
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husband's disposition of his property before death, whether in good faith or
in bad.3
In most jurisdictions inchoate dower has been abolished, and in its stead
the wife is given a statutory share in the estate of her husband at his death
of which he cannot deprive her by testamentary disposition.4  Numerous
cases have arisen in which the widow has sought to set aside inter vivos
transfers, usually made by the husband shortly before death and without
consideration, allegedly in derogation of her statutory share. If the transfer
is not effective to pass title from the donor to the donee, where, for example,
there was neither the intent to make a gift nor delivery, the property is still
part of the husband's estate in which the widow may share.5 Where the
gift is effective as between donor and donee, courts apply various criteria
to assess the validity of such transfers when attacked by the widow. A few
courts hold that subjective intent to defeat the wife's interest is sufficient
to render the transfer fraudulent ;6 but the majority, in determining whether
a transfer is colorable as far as the widow is concerned, stress the attributes
of ownership retained by the husband7 as evidence that the property was
part of his estate at death. Some courts have permitted a widow to share
in property in which her late husband retained a life estate ;8 others require
additional elements, such as the retention of the power of revocation0 or the
power of sale.10 In Pennsylvania, on the other hand; a husband may reserve
3. Bodner v. Felt, 247 App. Div. 119, 286 N. Y. Supp. 814 (1st Dep't 1936),
(1937) 37 CoL. L. REv. 317, (1937) 50 HARv. L REv. 529. The case has been settled
and will not be appealed.
4. This provision is more common in the case of personalty than of realty, but
within both classes the statutes vary in the different jurisdictions. For a complete
catalogue by states, see 3 VERNIER, A.sERIc.,, FAMLY LAws (1935) §§ 188, 189.
5. Brown v. Crafts, 98 Me. 40, 56 At. 213 (1903) ; Hayes v. Lindquist, 22 Ohio
App. 58, 153 N. E. 269 (1926). Compare Jaworski v. Wisniewski, 149 Md. 109, 131
Atl. 40 (1925) with Herman v. Jorgenson, 263 N. Y. 348, 189 N. E. 449 (1934).
6. Evans v. Evans, 78 N. H. 352, 100 At. 671 (1917); Thayer v. Thayer, 14
Vt 107, 39 Am. Dec. 211 (1842) (quoted at length in principal case); Nichols v.
Nichols, 61 Vt 426, 18 Atl. 153 (1889). But see Dunnett v. Shields, 97 Vt. 419. 427,
123 At. 626, 630 (1924); Patch v. Squires, 105 Vt. 405, 409, 165 Ati. 919, 920 (1933)
which distinguish early Vermont cases. See generally Cah,, Restraints On Disinheri-
tance (1936) 85 U. oF Pa. L. REv. 139. 150.
7. See Stewart v. Stewart, 5 Conn. 316. 320 (1824): Poole v. Poole, 96 Kan. 84,
90, 150 Pac. 592, 595 (1915) ; Jones v. Somerville, 78 Miss. 269, 273, 28 So. 940 (1900) ;
Farrell v. Puthoff, 13 Okla. 159, 163, 74 Pac. 96, 97 (1903) ; Potter Title & Trust Co.
v. Braum, 294 Pa. 482, 485, 144 Atl. 401, 402 (1928); (1935) 20 CoR:.. L Q. 381, 385.
8. Grover v. Clover, 69 Colo. 72, 169 Pac. 578 (1917); Walker v. Walker, 66
N. H. 390, 31 At. 14 (1891) ; see Rabbitt v. Gaither, 67 Md. 94, 104, 8 At. 744, 747
(1887). Contra: Osborn v. Osborn, 102 Kan. 890, 172 Pac. 23 (1918); Leonard v.
Leonard, 181 Mass. 458, 63 N. E. 1068 (1902); cf. Robb v. Vashington & Jefferson
College, 185 N. Y. 485, 78 N. E. 359 (1906) (gift to charitable corporation).
9. See Cameron v. Cameron, 18 .Miss. 394, 397. 48 Am. Dec. 759 (1848): Gentry
v. Bailey, 47 Va. 594, 604 (1850); (1933) 11 Cn1-KE T L Ray. 116; cf. Nicholls v.
Nicholls, 168 Cal. 444, 143 Pac. 712 (1914).
10. Brownell v. Briggs, 173 Mass. 529, 54 N. E. 251 (1899); Brown v. Crafts,
98 Me. 40, 56 Atl. 213 (1903).
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both a life estate and the power of revocation and still defeat his wife's right
to share in the property.'" In permitting the widow to recover in the prin-
cipal case the court evidently used both rules, for it relied upon the hus-
band's purpose to defeat her interest as well as his retention of a life
estate.
12
The discretion exercised by the courts in these cases may be justified be-
cause of the strong equities usually involved. Many of the suits are brought
by" the widow against children of a former marriage ;13 the gifts sought to
be set aside often constitute a substantial part of the husband's estate ;14 in
some cases the husband has made antenuptial representations upon which the
widow relied; 15 and the beneficiaries of the inter vivos gift may have exerted
undue influence upon the donor.16 And underlying all these cases is the
conflict between incompatible policies: protecting the widow, and assuring
free alienability of property. 17 The statutory share, even if strictly limited
to the estate of the husband at death, furnishes a measure of protection to
the widow: for a husband is not likely to impoverish himself by gifts of
substantial segments of his property during his lifetime. Furthermore, home-
stead and family allowance statutes provide more positive safeguards to the
widow.' 8 The following measure formulated for consideration by the Legis-
lature of North Carolina suggests a solution which may prove practicable
in giving the courts some discretion to compromise the conflicting equities
between the widow and donees of an inter vivos transfer and at the same
time in providing a measure of certainty in this field of law:
11. Lines v. Lines, 142 Pa. 149, 21 At. 809 (1891); Beirne v. Continental-Equit.
Trust Co., 307 Pa. 570, 161 Ati. 721 (1932), (1934) 8 TEMPr. L. Q. 531; cf. In re
Totten, 179 N. Y. 112, 71 N. E. 748 (1904); In re Clark's Estate, 149 Misc. 374, 268
N. Y. Supp. 253 (Surr. Ct. 1933).
12. The court might have invalidated the trust transfers which were made by way
of "Totten Trusts," on the ground that they were revocable, but apparently the wife is
not permitted a statutor. share in such trusts in New York. Matter of Clark, 149
Misc. 374. 268 N. Y. Supp. 253 (Surr. Ct. 1933) : Matter of Schurer, 157 Misc. 573,
289 N. V. Supp. 818 (Surr. Ct. 1935). It is odd, in view of the holding in the Schurer
case. that the court in the instant case did not even mention the fact that some of the
transfers of the husband were made by way of "Totten Trusts." Instead the court
seemed to rely m,,t strongly on the allegation of the complaint that the transfers were
made pursuant to a conspiracy between the husband and children to deprive the plaintiff
of her statutory share.
13. See Sederlund v. Sederlund, 176 Wis. 627, 635, 187 N. W. 750, 753 (1922).
14. Smith v. Smith, 22 Colo. 480. 46 Pac. 128 (1896); Payne v. Tatem, 236 Ky,
306, 33 S. W. (2d) 2 (1930).
15. Chandler v. Hollingsworth, 3 Del. Ch. 99 (1867) ; Rubin v. Myrub Realty Co.,
244 App. Div. 541. 279 N. Y. Supp. 867 (1st Dep't 1935) ; Comment (1901) 14 HARV.
L. REv. 452.
16. See Lestrange v. Lestrange. 242 App. Div. 74, 76, 273 N. Y. Supp. 21, 23
(2nd Dep't 1934).
17. See Wright v. Holmes, 100 Me. 508, 515, 62 At. 507, 510 (1905); Poole v.
Poole. 129 Md. 387, 390, 99 At. 551, 553 (1916): 3 VERNIER. AMERICAN, FAMILY LAWS
(1935) 349.
18. See 3 XERXIER. AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS (1935) §228.
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I. Any gratuitous transfer of property, real or personal, shall be
deemed to be in fraud of a wife, unless she join therein or assent
thereto in writing if:
(1) the husband retains the power to revoke it during his life-
time, whether exercisable by him alone or in conjunction
with any person not having a substantial adverse interest, or
(2) the transfer be in contemplation of death and takes place
within one year prior thereto.
(a) A gratuitous transfer without the assent of the wife,
shall, if made within one year prior to his death, be
presumed to be in contemplation of death, but such
presumption may be rebutted.
II. No action may be instituted by the widow or by the husband's
personal representative at the request of the widow after two years
from the date of the husband's death.19
While these provisions do not purport to be a comprehensive code, they
do formulate broad rules which not only-carry out the purpose of the statutes
abolishing inchoate dower in giving the husband, prior to a certain period
before death, power to dispose of his property as he sees fit,'̂ ° but also define
with some certainty the property to which the widow's rights will attach.
By including revocable gifts in the latter category the statute enacts the
rule announced by most courts, that since the donor has parted with sub-
stantially no control, the disposition should be regarded as testamentary.2'
As proposed in the statute, gifts made in contemplation of death are com-
monly classed as testamentary, the reason given being that the economic
restraints attending inter vivos transfers are absent.2 2 By creating a rebuttable
presumption when the transfer occurs within a year of death, the statute
narrows the field of litigation and at the same time give a degree of flexi-
bility which should enable the courts to dispose of particularly hard cases
as their discretion dictates. By means of the two year statute of limitation
dilatory actions and resulting uncertainty in the title of the property trans-
19. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON REVIsION OF THE LAWS OF NORTH CAROLINA
REATiNG TO ESTATES (1936) 34-37. For other statutes and proposals see TENN. CODE
ANN. (Williams, 1934) § 8365; VT. PuB. LAws (1933) § 2963; Cahn, Restraints in
Disinheritance (1936) 85 U. OF PA. L. REv. 139; Eagleton, Introduction to the Intestacy
Act and the Dower Rights Act (1935) 20 IOwA L. REv. 241.
20. See 3 VERNIER, Am~Rc.%-i FAMILY LAWS (1935) 347; (1935) 35 CoL. L REv.
113.
21. See Nicholls v. Nicholls, 168 Cal. 444, 447, 143 Pac. 712, 713 (1914); Brownell
v. Briggs, 173 Mass. 529, 533, 54 N. E. 251, 253 (1899); Gentry v. Bailey, 47 Va.
594, 604 (1850); Ballantine, Wihen are Deeds Testamentary (1920) 18 Mxcu. L. REv.
470.
22. Dyer v. Smith, 62 Mo. App. 606 (1895); Newton v. Newton, 162 Mo. 173,
61 S. W. 881 (1901). A fortiori gifts causa mortis should be subject to the widow's
share. Crawfordsville Trust Co. v. Ramsay, 55 Ind. App. 40, 100 N. E. 1049 (1913).
Hatcher v. Buford, 60 Ark. 169, 29 S. IV. 641 (1895); Contra: York v. Trigg, 87
Okla. 214, 209 Pac. 417 (1922).
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ferred are prevented. 23 Transfers in which the husband retains merely a
life estate are not prohibited by the statute, and this result seems sound.
By an irrevocable gift of the remainder after a life estate the husband has
divested himself entirely of control over the corpus, and no change of cir-
cumstances or inclination can enable him to recall the gift. The postpone-
ment of the time when the beneficiaries would take possession and receive
the benefits should not render the gift testamentary.
24
DISCOVERY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THIRD PARTIES IN NEW YORK*
THE NEW YORK legislature has periodically attempted to aid the judg-
ment creditor by simplifying the procedure for the discovery of assets of
the debtor and the prevention of their conveyance beyond his reach.' Prior
to 1935 the examination of a third party who was believed to have assets
of the debtor could be procured only after a court order issued upon satis-
factory proof that he had "personal property" of the judgment debtor or
was indebted to him. 2 Largely in order to make it unnecessary for the person
seeking discovery to prove the thing he wished to discover, the Civil Prac-
tice Act was amended in 1935. 3 Under the present practice a judgment
creditor may, by service of subpoena within two years of the judgment,
force the examination of any third party who he has reason to believe is in
possession of property belonging to or is indebted to the judgment debtor.
And under Section 781 of the Civil Practice Act he may, by endorsing
that section upon the subpoena, forbid such person to transfer any assets
of the debtor on pain of contempt of court.
23. Only eight jurisdictions (Ala., Ga., Iowa, Kan., Mass., Mo., Mont., Ore.) have
statutes of limitations which expressly apply to actions or claims for dower. They
range from five to twenty years. See 3 VERNIER, AmERICAN FAMILY LAWS (1935)
§ 212.
24. Phillips v. Phillips, 30 Colo. 516, 71 Pac. 363 (1903) ; Smith v. Corey, 125
Minn. 190, 145 N. W. 1067 (1914); In re Sides' Estate, 119 Neb. 314, 228 N. W. 619
(1930) ; Hall v. Hall, 109 Va. 117, 63 S. E. 420 (1909); Comment (1932) 18 VA. L.
REV. 334.
*Capital Co. v. Fox, 85 F. (2d) 97 (C. C.A. 2d, 1936).
1. See Comment (1934) 11 N. Y. U. L. Q. REV. 623. Only one-fourth of the
judgments recovered in New York City in 1934 are said to have been paid, Levien,
Making Money Judgments Collectible, N. Y. L. J., Nov. 20, 1934, p. 1900, col, 2;
see Cohen, Collection of Money Judgments it New York (1935) 35 COL. L. Rv. 1007.
2. N. Y. CiV. PRAc. AcT, former § 785, amended, 1935 (see note 3, infra) ; see
Capital Co. v. Fox, 15 F. Supp. 677 (S. D. N. Y. 1936).
3. N. Y. CIV. PRAc. AcT § 779. The sufficiency of proof was frequently attacked,
since it was necessary for the creditor to show the source of his information and the
grounds for his belief that the third party had property belonging to the debtor. Pierce
v. Parrish, 28 App. Div. 22, 50 N. Y. Supp. 735 (4th Dep't 1898); In the 'Matter of
First Nat. Bank of Earlville, 99 App. Div. 20, 90 N. Y. Supp. 941 (3rd Dep't 1904);




The constitutionality of this statute has recently been upheld by the Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.4 A judgment creditor had served
subpoenas upon five stockbrokers commanding them to appear for exam-
ination with respect to property of the judgment debtor held by them either
in his name or for him in the name of designated persons and corporations.
The "third parties" moved to vacate the subpoenas on the ground that they
constituted an unconstitutional search and had been issued without due
process of law. Section 781 of the Civil Practice Act, they claimed, was
unconstitutional on the latter score in that it provided for the issuance of
an injunction by a party in interest and not by judicial authority under
recognized procedural and probative requirements. The district court, never-
theless, denied the motions to vacate, and its order was affirmed on appeal.
The circuit court answered the argument based on the searches and seizures
clause by observing that the examination was subject to proper limitation
by a judge or referee and that the subpoenas duces tecum were sufficiently
definite. And the statute did not violate due process of law, the court held,
because it did not declare that the plaintiff's attorney might in advance of
hearing forbid the third party's transfer of any specific property under pain
of contempt, but measured the extent of the prohibition by the judgment
debtor's ownership of the property held by the third party; it merely created,
therefore, "a new class of unlawful acts," imposing the penalty of contempt
of court for disobedience.
The court did not refer to a second contention of the third parties on the
due process score-that the subpoenas enjoined the disposition of property
in which they might be beneficially interested through margin loans and con-
sequently interfered with the lawful conduct of their business:5 In view of
the court's definition of the scope of the prohibition permitted by Section
781, however, sale of the judgment debtor's securities by the brokers to
protect margin loans would seem not to constitute a violation of the sub-
poena endorsed upon the third party order under that section, if the interest
of the judgment debtor in the securities were entirely wiped out by a fall
in the price of the securities or if any surplus over the margin loan were
held for the creditor.6 In any event, unless the drop in the market were
4. Capital Co. v. Fox, 85 F. (2d) 97 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936), off *g 15 F. Supp. 677
(S.D. N. Y. 1936). But see note 5, infra.
5. Brief for Appellants, p. 37, Capital Co. v. Fox, 85 F. (2d) 97 (C. C.A. 2d,
1936). The United States Supreme Court, in passing upon the jurisdiction of the
Circuit Court of Appeals to review an order holding the judgment debtor in this con-
troversy in contempt for failure to respond to a subpoena, expressly refrained from
any statement as to the rights of third parties cited for contempt. See Fox v. Capital
Co., 57 S. Ct. 57, 59 (1936). Perhaps the denial of a jury trial to strangers for an
"unlawful act" may appear less reasonable to the Court than similar punishment of
a recalcitrant debtor who refuses to respond to a subpoena. No actual contempt citation
was involved in the instant case.
6. Cf. Anderson v. Keystone Chemical Supply Co.. -293 Ill. 468, 127 N. F. 668
(1920). But cf. Beverwyck Breweries. Inc. v. Adelsberg, 160 Misc. 130, 289 N. Y.
Supp. 544 (City Ct. 1936) (bank which transferred judgment debtor's deposit to itself
upon receiving service of third party subpoena held in contempt despite its ownership
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unusually sudden and severe, such brokers could insure themselves against
a possible contempt citation by stipulation with the creditor or by obtaining
an order of court permitting the sale. Furthermore, protection against the
abuse of the process is afforded by an opportunity to move to vacate the
subpoena after its issuance.7 Procedural due process requires only that an
opportunity be given for hearing and defense.8 The present statute in New
York is apparently no more onerous in this respect than the former proce-
dure, where an ex parte order issued upon affidavit of the judgment creditor
prohibited the transfer of the debtor's property.
Nor is the burden cast upon third parties by this statute more unreason-
able than those involved in more familiar procedures employed in aid of col-
lection. A court of equity acting upon a creditor's bill may enjoin transfer of
the debtor's property in the possession of third parties.9 And third parties
transfer property belonging to the debtor at the risk of being held responsible
for the value of the property in those states where an action may be begun
by foreign attachment or garnishment.10 The writ is sometimes issued by a
party in interest without judicial intervention." These procedures have not
been considered unconstitutional. The New York statute provides for punish-
ment for contempt; the more usual provision is to make the third party liable
for the value of the property transferred. 12 The difference is not a real one,
however; for civil contempt under this statute will probably be punished by
a fine amounting normally to the value of the property transferred and pay-
able to the creditor.
13
of judgment debtor's unmatured note which provided for its becoming due if judgment
were recovered against debtor).
7. See In re Cornblum, 133 Misc. 357, 359, 232 N. Y. Supp. 22, 25 (Sup. Ct.
1928). Upon such a motion, in fact, the judgment creditor must offer sufficient proof,
the Appellate Division in New York has held, to allow the court reasonably to infer
that the third party is in possession of property of the debtor, although one justice
protested that this requirement impaired the purpose of the amendment. N. Y. Credit
Men's Ass'n v. Schneider, 247 App. Div. 896, 286 N. Y. Supp. 978 (2d Dep't 1936);
Goodman v. Citarello, N. Y. L. J.. May 4, 1936, p. 2274, co. 7 (N. Y. City Ct.);
Breasted v. Richmond, N. Y. L. J., May 14, 1936, p. 2474, col. 2 (N. Y. City Ct.);
Melvin Constr. Co. v. Weitzel, N. Y. L. J., May 15, 1936, p. 2498, col. 1 (N. Y. City
Ct.). Judge Hand in the instant case refused to "put so crippling an interpretation
upon the amendment" until the New York Court of Appeals so decided. Capital Co.
v. Fox, 85 F. (2d) 97, 100 (C.C.A. 2d, 1936).
8. Hagar v. Reclamation District, 111 U. S. 701 (1884); Holden v. Hardy, 169
U.S. 366 (1898).
9. Bien v. Robinson, 208 U. S. 423 (1908).
10. E.g., ILL. REv. STAT. ANN. (Smith-Hurd, 1935) c. 11, § 21; MASS. ANN. LAWS
(Lawyer's Co-op.. 1933) c. 246, § 1.
11. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. (1930) §5763.
12. E.g., id., § 5814; MAss. ANN. LAWS (Lawyer's Co-op., 1933) c. 246, § 20.
13. N. Y. JUDIcIARY LAW § 773; Fitzsimmons v. Ryan, 64 App. Div. 404, 72 N.Y.
Supp. 65 (2d Dep't 1901); WAIT, MANUAL OF SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEEDINGS AND
GARNISHEE EXECUTIONS (1936) 273.
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CoNxFcT OF LWS AND THE GOLD CLAUSE IN FOREIGN
GOVERNMENT BONDS*
ALTHOUGH the Joint Resolution' was adopted four years ago, the propriety
of its application to contracts of an international character 2 is still uncertain.
The ramifications of the problem, a dual one of determining whether American
law controls and, if so, whether international contracts are within the reach
of the Resolution, are illustrated by recent litigation in the English courts.
The holder of gold dollar bonds, offered, allotted, and issued in New York
by the English government through a syndicate of American bankers, sought
by a declaratory judgment to determine his rights upon presentment in New
York. The bonds were registerable only in New York and were payable
at the holder's option either in New York or London.3 Although the essential
elements of making, registering and performing the contract were thus
closely associated with the United States, both the King's Bench and the
Court of Appeal were agreed that, since the English government was a party
to the bonds, the English law should govern their construction.m4 These same
courts differed, however, in the interpretation to be given the gold clause
in the bonds. The lower court, reading it to require payment in gold dollars,
held that, since such performance would be unlawful where due,3 the obligor
was discharged from performance to the extent of the illegality.0 The upper
*The King v. International Trustee for Protection of Bondholders, The Times
(London), Jan. 29, 1937, p. 4, col. 5 (H. L. 1937).
1. 48 STAT. 113 (1933), 31 U.S. C. § 463 (1934); Norman v. B. & 0. R. R.,
294 U. S. 240 (1935) (Resolution valid as to private domestic contracts); Perry v.
United States, 294 U. S. 330 (1935).
2. That is, contracts whose elements are drawn from more than one country.
See Nussbaum, Comparathe and International Aspects of American Gold Clause Abro-
gation (1934) 44 YALE L. J. 53.
3. Principal and interest were payable in New York in gold coin, or, at the option
of the holder, in London in sterling at a fixed rate of exchange. The conflict of laws
as applied to bonds permitting collection in several currencies is extensively treated in
Nussbaum, Multiple Currency and Index Clauses (1936) 84 U. oF PA. L REv. 569.
4. International Trustee for Protection of Bondholders v. The King, 52 T. I. R.
82, 84 (K. B. 1935); s. c. 155 L. T. R. 591, 594 (C. A. 1936); (1937) 85 U. op PA.
L. RLv. 422; (1936) 3 NouvruLE REvUE DE DRorr IxTR;ATIoAL Pasvk 835.
5. 48 STAT. 340 (1934); 31 U.S. C.A. §§ 442, 443 (1936.)
6. International Trustee for Protection of Bondholders v. The King, 52 T.L.R.
82, 88 (K. B. 1935). This result is in accord with the growing tendency to excuse, on
the grounds of comity or impossibility, the performance of a contract involving the
commission of an act prohibited in the foreign country where it is to be performed.
Ralli Bros. v. Compania Naviera Sota Y Aznar, [1920] 2 K. B. 287; Foster v. Driscoll,
[1929] 1 K. B. 470. The court might have reached a contrary decision, however, by
refusing to hear the defense of illegality on the ground that the law forbidding per-
formance is against the strong public policy of the forum. Glynn v. United Steel Works
Corp., 160 .Misc. 405, 289 N. Y. Supp. 1037 (Sup. Ct. 1935); Central Hanover B. &
T. Co. v. Siemens & Haske, 15 F. Supp. 927 (S.D. N.Y. 1936) semble; ef. Allatini
& Co. v. Abbott, 26 L. T. R. (N.s.) 746, 748 (Supreme Consular Ct. of Constantinople,
1872); Sichel, Problems Raised by the Holzer Case (1936) 45 Y.tA L J. 1463, 1467.
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court, on the contrary, construed the clause as a gold value clause requiring
payment of the monetary equivalent of gold dollars. The performance of
a clause so interpreted, although unenforceable and against public policy in
the United States, is not there unlawful. Consequently the obligation to pay
the value of gold was undischarged,7 it was argued, and remained enforce-
able in the English courts." The House of Lords, however, rejecting the
reasoning of both courts, decided that the bonds were to be construed ac-
cording to the law of the United States; and since by that law the gold
clause was inoperative, the recovery of the bondholder was limited to the
nominal amount of the bond in legal tender.9
The conclusion of the House of Lords that American law should be recog-
nized as the law of the contract in this case can be supported by any one
of the principal rules used to govern the choice of controlling law in con-
flicts cases: the law of the place of performance, the law of the place of
contracting, or the law the parties intended to be controlling.1" The necessity
for electing one of these rules may, however, be avoided by a preliminary
classification of the gold clause involved. Thus if the clause is wholly a
gold coin clause inserted in the bonds not to fix their value but to indicate
that the desired medium of payment is gold dollars, it relates to the mode
of performance and is therefore subject to the law of the United States,
where performance, under the facts stipulated, is due. 1 The gold clause
7. The doctrine of excuse is limited, by this decision, to acts which are expressly
prohibited. Comity, however, might justify giving consideration to another country's
public policy as well as to its express prohibitions. P.P.G.C. v. Socidt~s Siemens et
Halske et Siemens Schuckertwerke, Civil Tribunal of the Seine, July 23, 1936, 3 Nouvelle
Revue de Droit International Priv6 792 semble. In support of the instant decision of the
Court of Appeal, it seems more significant that performance would not interfere with
economic stability or a uniform system of currency in the United States.
8. International Trustee for Protection of Bondholders v. The King, 155 L. T. R.
591, 597 (C. A. 1936). It may be argued, however, on the basis of the territorial
theory of law. (See BEALE. 3 CASES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1902) 501, 515, 517)
that if there is no breach of contract or right to damages at the place of performance,
the plaintiff's right in any court would be limited to restitution of the consideration
given or to the secondary right recognized at the place of performance. Randolph
Grocery Co. v. Lamborn, 3 F. (2d) 139 (C. C. A. 4th, 1924); Sandham v. Grounds,
94 Fed. 83 (C. C. A. 3d. 1899): see RESTATEMENT, CONnICT OF LAWS (1934) §370.
The decision of the Court of Appeal is supported, however, by the contrary theory
under which any forum under its own laws may attach legal consequences directly to
the breach of the primary duty wherever it occurred. See Lorenzen, The Theory of
Qualifications and the Conflict of Laws (1920) 20 COL. L. REV. 247, 277, 279; cf. Jacobs
v. Credit Lyonnais. 12 Q. B. D. 589 (1884); Sokoloff v. National City Bank, 239 N. Y.
158, 145 N.E. 917 (1924).
9. The King v. International Trustee for Protection of Bondholders, The Times
(London), Jan. 29, 1937, p. 4, col. 5 (H. L. 1937). The decision was announced in
advance of an opinion.
10. See GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1927) § 107. The domicile of the promisor
is an additional alternative that has occasionally been utilized on the continent. See
BAR, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (Gillespie's trans. 1892) §250.
11. 2 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1935) §355.1; Lorenzen, Validity and Effects
of Contracts in the Conflict of Laws (1921) 31 YALE L. J. 53, 65.
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here involved, however, has a broader function. It is more reasonable to
assume that payment in gold was sought not for its use as a commodity but,
as a measure of the obligation, to protect the bondholder against monetary
fluctuation." And if functionally the clause is a value clause, it is not a
formality of performance, but an essential element in the substance of the
obligation.' 3 As such it should be governed by the law properly applicable
to the body of the contract.
There are, however, no generally accepted criteria by which the courts
determine the proper law to apply to the substance of an obligation of this
type. Although the literature is confused, significance hs frequently been
accorded the law of the place of contracting.' 4 The use of this formula as
controlling, however, is objectionable both because it is arbitrary and for-
tuitous 5 and because it necessitates a preliminary determination of the place
where the contract was actually made. The latter, on occasion, may be con-
ceptually difficult' 6 or even physically impossible.1 1 In the case of bonds,
for example, the process of syndication, especially if complicated as in the
principal case by the use of convertible notes,18 makes the selection of the
operative place of contracting extremely difficult.19 This difficulty is avoided
12. Gold coin clauses, and also gold bullion clauses, are usually gold value clauses
in function. See Holyoke Water Power Co. v. American Writing Paper Co., 83 F.
(2d) 398, 403 (C. C. A. 1st, 1936), off'd, U. S. Sup. Ct., (1937) 4 U. S. L. WNEE 751,
752; Schniitthoff, The Gold Clause in International Loans (1936) 18 J. Coup. L;. &
INT. L. 266, 272; (1936) 46 YALE L. J. 348.
13. F6rsiikringsaktiebolaget Skandia v. Riksgaldskontoret, Royal Svea Court of
Appeal, Stockholm, Apr. 16, 1935, 33 Bulletin de l'Institut Juridique International 142,
144; see NUSSAum, DAs GE.D (1925) 178.
14. Carnegie v. Morrison, 2 'et. 381 (Mass. 1841); Carmen v. Higginson, 245
Mlass. 511, 140 N.E. 246 (1923).
15. BAR, Op. cit. supra note 10, § 249 at 540; SAVYWNY, PRIVATE INTEmNATIONAL LAw
(Guthrie's trans. 1880) 198.
16. Cf. 2 BEALE, CONFLICr OF LAWS (1935) §§312.3, 313.1, 319.1, 331.1.
17. See the example given in STUNBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1937) at 207.
18. For the terms of these notes see Listing Statement A-4748 (1917) 15 Lisr. IN
STATEMSENTS OF THE N. Y. STocK ExcH. 652. A similar complication would arise if
temporary bonds or interim receipts were first issued to the public and subsequently
were replaced by the bonds. Cf. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Dunken, 266 U. S. 3S9 (1924).
19. The place of the underlying contract between the issuer and the originating
banker, which usually is negotiated by cable. may fix the proper law of the bond. See
Sauser-Hall. Opinion on Loans Issucd by the Goincrniclt of Sweden (1934) 1 PIrpscn,
THE GOLD CLAUSE (2d ed. 1936) 69, 72. Again the operative place may be fixed by
the first actual sale of the bond. See Goldschmidt, Zur Tiworic dcr J'crthpapierc (1832)
28 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR DAS GESAMMITE HANDELSRECIIT 63. 100. This might be the sale
to the originating banker. Compania de Inversiones Internacionales v. Industrial Mfort-
gage Bank of Finland, 269 N. Y. 22, 25, 198 N. E. 617, 618 (1935), cert. denied, 297
U. S. 705 (1936) semble. But if the functions of the originating banker are limited to
preliminary negotiation [see 48 STAT. 74 (1933); 15 U.S.C. §77b(3) (1934)] the
first actual sale would then be to the original purchase group. Courts have also con-
sidered material the place of the contract with the first holder among the general
public. Appeldoorn v. Osram, DistriEt Court of Amsterdam, 3d Chamber, March 22,
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in the instant case, however, for in England the place of contracting is not
in itself decisive of the proper law to control the essential rights of the con-
tracting parties.20  Nor is the law of the place of performance necessarily
controlling in England 21 although in the United States negotiable instru-
ments like the bearer bonds in question are generally referred to that law.
22
The English courts, refusing to accept either of these competing rules, at-
tempt in each case to decide, by reference to the particular facts, what law
the parties intended to be controlling. Uncertainty is the consequence in any
given case,2 3 but the elasticity of such a formula enables the courts to apply
the law of that jurisdiction which has the most significant points of contact
with the contract in question.24 Thus in the principal case the application
of American law would ordinarily have been assured, since the bonds were
in almost all material respects associated with the United States. 25 Yet the
fact that the English sovereign was the obligor of the bonds was held by
the lower courts conclusive of an intention that the law of England should
govern. 20  It was argued that the promise of a sovereign can be enforced
only by a court to the jurisdiction of which the sovereign submits, and
further that, in the absence of a stipulation to the contrary, there is a pre-
sumption that a sovereign will submit only to the jurisdiction of its own courts.
This presumption, supplemented by a dubious analogy, 27 was deemed to
justify the further presumption that the parties here intended to be governed
by the law of England. The sequence of presumptions seems unjustified,
2 8
1935, [1935] Nederlandsche Jurisprudentie 590; ci. Smith v. Weguelin, L. R. 8 Eq.
198 (M. R. 1869); Case of Serbian Loans, P.C. 1.J., Ser. A, No. 20 at 42 (1929).
This is undesirable because of the possible, diversity of laws governing a single bond
issue.
20. In re Francke & Rasch, [1918] 1 Ch. 470; Benaim v. Debono, (1924] A. C. 514.
The place of contracting does, however, govern certain other matters. See Bills of
Exchange Act, 1882, 45 & 46 VIcT. c. 61, § 72 (1), (2).
21. Scott v. Pilkington, 31 L. J. Q. B. 81, 90 (1862); see Guaranty Trust Co.
v. Hannay & Co., [1918] 2 K. B. 623, 654. The law of the place of performance is
occasionally pertinent, however. See Bill of Exchange Act, 1882, 45 & 46 Vxcr. c. 61,
§ 72(4), (5).
22. LORENZEN, CONFLICT OF LAWS RELATING TO BILLS AND NOTES (1919) 105.
23. See 2 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1935) §332.2; Lorenzen, suipra note 11 at
30 YALE L. J. 658, 671.
24. See Jones v. Oceanic Steam Navigation Co., [1924] 2 K. B. 730, 733.
25. See International Trustee for Protection of Bondholders v. The King, 52
T. L. R. 82, 84 (K. B. 1935); s. c., 155 L. T. R. 591, 593 (C. A. 1936).
26. This result has some support in English dicta. See Smith v. Weguelin, L. R.
8 Eq. 198, 212 (M. R. 1869); Goodwin v. Robarts, 1 App. Cas. 476, 494 (1876).
See also Cases of Serbian and Brazilian Loans, P.C. I.J., Ser. A, No. 20/21 (1929).
The application of the sovereign's law led to diplomatic protests. BoRCiIARD, Tn
DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD (1915) 295.
27. The analogy used was that of an express stipulation to arbitrate in England,
which was contained in a contract made in Java for goods to be delivered in Bombay
with payment in Hong Kong. N. V. Kwik Hoo Tong Handel Maatschappij v. Finlay,
[1927] A. C. 604, 608.
28. The premise that the English government could be sued only in England, even
if tenable, does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the English courts should apply
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and the practical consequences of allowing a debtor to control his debt are
disturbing.29 It seems more realistic to infer, wherever suit is brought, that
contracting parties, even if sovereign, intend to submit to the law of the
country of which the formalities of the bond are characteristic and in which
almost all of the significant transactions pertaining to the bond were to take
place.
The conclusion that the bond in the principal case should be construed
with reference to American law, however, does not decide the case; for it
is not certain that the Joint Resolution should be applied to annul all gold
dollar clauses subject to the American law. It is felt in some quarters that
the American statute should be construed to apply only to domestic contracts,
so as to continue to permit the making of international contracts in gold, a
measure of value not directly affected by domestic currency manipulations3 0
But inasmuch as the American courts have not exempted international gold
clause contracts from the scope of the Joint Resolution,3 it would seem no
longer open to foreign courts thus to interpret the American law.3 2 For
only English local law to the obligation. It night more plausibly be considered a sub-
mission as an ordinary litigant to English courts applying English law inclusive of
its normal conflicts rules, a process which leads here to the inference, from the facts
of the transaction, that New York law was "intended" to measure the obligation.
Moreover, even if the absence of any provision for suit is regarded as an express stip-
ulation of submission to the English courts, it would not be conclusive that English
law governs. Such stipulations raise an inference to be balanced against others suggested
by the completed contract and its context However, the absence of a stipulation as to
the place of suit need not be regarded even as consent to be sued in England. Permission
to sue is always necessary and might be given in any court. It is, therefore, not certain
but only probable that suit could be brought only in England. Similarly it is probable
that any foreign debtor must be sued at his residence. The difference in probability seems
an insufficient justification for the presumption that a sovereign submits only to the
jurisdiction of its own courts, especially since parties to this type of contract would
not anticipate the suit's being brought on the bonds. Also see BoRcumAn, TnE D-Lo-
MATIC PROTEcTIoN OF CmTIzENs AROAD (1915) 304. Moreover, that presumption would
be difficult to administer. It seems equally applicable to bonds of municipalities, govern-
mental districts, and government owned corporations and also to private corporation
bonds, especially if guaranteed by a government
29. Such a power would nullify the precautions demanded by the lender such as
gold clauses, sinking funds, payment at the creditors' domicile in their currency, ex-
emption from taxation by the debtor, deposit of collateral, hypothecation of revenues,
and guarantees of other nations. As a result of the decision of the Court of Appeal, the
Canadian government subsequently prepared legislation to abrogate the gold clauses
in its bonds. N.Y. Times, Jan. 6, 1937, p. 31, col. 6.
30. See Deutscher Sparkassen- und Giroverband, German Supreme Court, May 28,
1936, Juristische Wochenschrift, 1936 II. 2058, 2061, (IV 272/35); Sauser-Hall, .upra
note 19 at 80; (1936) 45 YALE L. J. 723.
31. Compania de Inversiones Internacionales v. Industrial Mortgage Bank of Fin-
land, 269 N. Y. 22, 198 N.E. 617 (1935), cert. denied, 297 U.S. 705 (1936) ; (1936)
45 YALE L J. 723.
32. But see Peten v. Antwerp, Civil Court of Antwerp, Jan. 5, 1935, 32 Bulletin de
rInstitut Juridique Int. 93, 96.
19371
THE 34LE LAW JOURNAL
reasons of their strong public policy, however, such foreign courts may decide
not to permit the Resolution to apply despite the conclusion that American
law governs.3 3 ' Tle effect of gold clause legislation is more pronounced upon
foreign than domestic contracting partiesY4 Foreign courts are therefore
particularly likely to refuse to apply the Resolution, even where American
law is expressly stipulated to be the law of the contract,aa if its enforcement
endangers economic stability at the forum,aC if the bond was issued and
performance is due and demanded outside the United States,3 if neither party
is a resident or citizen of the United States, "-" or if the policy of the forum
has been to attribute extraordinary sanctity to the obligations of listed securi-
ties and international contracts, 39 as is often done because of the importance
of international commerce to domestic prosperity. In the principal case, the
last two considerations might be important, but the existence of a public
policy against gold clause abrogation seems improbable in England where
the gold clause plays only a minor commercial r6le.
40
33. Compare the action of an American court which, in applying the public policy
of the Joint Resolution, refused to enforce, for an American creditor, an option for
payment in guilders-and so outside the terms of the Resolution-in a bond issued in
America by an American and primarily payable in dollars. City Bank Farmers Trust
Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 244 App. Div. 634, 280 N. Y. S. 494 (1st Dep't 1935);
Anglo-Continentale Treuhand v. So. Pac. Co., N. Y. L. J., Jan. 2, 1937, p. 9, col. 4
(Sup. Ct. N. Y. 1936). Contra: Anglo-Continentale Treuhand v. St. Louis S. W.
R. R. 81 F. (2d) 11 (C. C. A. 2d. 1936) cert. denied, 298 U.S. 655 (1936) (foreign
holder who had purchased his bond from an American after the passage of the Resolu-
tion) ; Nederlandsche Middenstandsbank v. Bethlehem Steel Co., N. Y. L. J., June 13,
1936, p. 3029, col. 3 (N. Y. Sup. Ct.).
34. The plaintiffs in the instant case are continental insurance companies who have
been required to pay their policyholders in gold. See German Supreme Court, Jan. 31,
1936, 150 Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in Zivilsachen 153 (VII 276/35).
35. The courts have not considered themselves bound to adopt the stipulated law
as the proper law of the contract. See Rabel, Golddollar-Anleihen mit Iereinbarung des
New Yorker Rechts (1936) 10 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR AUSLANDISCnES UND INTERNATIONALES
PRIVATRECHT 492.
36. See Deutscher Sparkassen- und Giroverband, German Supreme Court, May 28,
1936, Juristische Wochenschrift, 1936 IT. 2058, 2060 (IV 272/35).
37. Appeldoorn v. Osram, District Court of Amsterdam, 3d Chamber, March 22,
1935, [19351 N-ederlandsche Jurisprudentie 590.
38. See Hungarian Regal Curia, 5th Senate, Sept. 26, 1935 (C. VII 585/35) ; Jogi
Hirlap, No. 963, 333 (1935) ; 2 PLEs. n . THlE GOLD CLAUSE (2d ed., 1936) 43. But
cf. Vereeniging voor den Effectenhandel v. Koninklijke Nederlandsche Maatschapplj,
Supreme Court of the Netherlands. March 13, 1936, 34 Bulletin de l'Institut Juridique
Int. 304.
39. Peten v. Antwerp, Civil Court of Antwerp, Jan. 5, 1935, 32 Bulletin de l'Institut
Juridique Int. 93; Soci~t6 du Port de Rosario v. Dame Thirion, Cour de Cassation,
July 9, 1930, Dalloz Hebdomadaire, 1930, 441; Reynaud v. Banque Hypoth6caire Franco-
Argentine, Cour de Cassation. Feb. 14. 1934. Dalloz Hebdomadaire, 1934, 177; cf.
Holland Gold Clause Bill, Wall St. J.. Dec. 18, 1936, p. 10, col. 2.
40. See Wortley, The Gold Clause (1936) 17 BRIT. YEAR BoOK OF INT. L. 112, n, 4.
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THE DISCRETIONARY STAY AS A STRATEGIC DEvIcE IN
CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION*
STAY ORDERS are familiar adjuncts of the judicial process. They have been
used to serve the convenience of litigants,' to meet the practical exigencies
of trial,2 and to prevent the courts from becoming a medium of injustice.3
Yet, where there is prospect of harmful consequence to any party4 or it is
believed that the only object of the desired stay is to secure delay5 or
strategic advantage to one of the litigants, 6 the courts have been zealous in
their refusal to suspend proceedings. A relaxation from ,the rigor of this
position, however, when the government is a party and the issues are of
extraordinary public concern, has recently been indicated by the United
States Supreme Court.' The Securities and Exchange Commission, con-
fronted with the prospect of defending a multitude of suits challenging the
validity of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935,8 brought suit
in New York against a selected utility system to obtain, under conditions
deemed most favorable to it, a speedy determination of so much of the
constitutionality of the Act as could be adjudicated at that time. Unable
to defend against the threatened litigati6n without considerable expense and
*Landis v. North American Company, 299 U. S. 248 (1936).
1. Andrews v. Spear, 1 Fed. Cas. No. 379 (C. C. Minn. 1877) (stay granted to
avoid waste of time and expense to litigants); Deutsch v. Southern Improvement &
Securities Corp., 53 F. (2d) 96 (N. D. Tex. 1931) (stay to facilitate collection of rents
from land under litigation); Levy v. Pacific Eastern Corp., 154 Misc. 655, 277 N. Y.
Supp. 659 (Sup. Ct 1935) (stay to avoid unnecessary burden of participating in similar
actions in different courts).
2. In re Ackerman's Estate, 166 N. Y. Supp. 1080 (Surr. Ct. 1917) (stay to
permit substituted attorney to acquire papers necessary for presentation of case);
Adams v. Bankers' Life Co., 36 S. IV. (2d) 182 (Tex. Comm. App. 1931) (stay to
bring in necessary party).
3. Langnes v. Green. 282 U. S. 531 (1931) (admiralty action sta)ed to preserve
plaintiffs right to common law remedy); Keystone Dairy Co. v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co.,
19 F. (2d) 68 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1927) (action on policy stayed to preserve insurer's
defenses in cancellation suit); Rohrback v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N. Y., 82 F. (2d)
291, 293 (C. C. A. 8th, 1936) (same purpose); Stephens v. Wheeler, 193 Wis. 164,
213 N.W. 464 (1927) (action for fraud in inducing purchase of property stayed until
maximum loss determined in plaintiff's foreclosure action).
4. Pollak v. Long Island Lighting Co.. 246 App. Div. 765, 283 N. Y. Supp. 913
(2d Dep't 1935) (prejudicial stay reversed where consolidation without prejudice avail-
able); cf. Commonwealth of Pa. v. Williams. 294 U. S. 176, 185 (1935) (equity may
refuse to protect private right where prejudicial to public interest hut will stay hand
where private right will not suffer).
5. E. B. Ficklen Tobacco Co. v. Friedberg, 196 App. Div. 409, 187 N.Y. Supp.
561 (Ist Dep't 1921).
6. Kansas City Carpet Co. v. Smith, 25 S. W. (2d) 539 (Mo. App. 1930) (stay
denied where purpose was to compel specific election to abandon suit and deny the
plaintiff the right to make own choice as to whom it would pursue).
7. Landis v. North American Co., 299 U. S. 248 (1936).
8. 49 STAT. 838 (1935), 15 U.S.C.A. §79 (Supp. 1936): Comment (1936)
45 YALE L. J. 468.
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unwilling to sacrifice the supposed advantage of appearing under circum-
stances of its own selection, the Commission planned in various ways to
avoid any other test on the merits.9 Pursuant to this policy a stay of pro-
ceedings brought in the District of Columbia was sought by the government
pending termination of the New York case. The trial, court granted this
stay but conditioned it upon a diligent prosecution of the selected test case.
On appeal the order was reversed by a court so" divided as to the nature of
the staving power and its limitations that the Supreme Court found it neces-
.ary to issue certiorari.' 0 The latter court, believing that the power to issue
a stay in one case pending a decision in another action extended to contro-
versies involving different parties and different issues and believing also
that the public importance of the issues here involved was a significant con-
sideration in the decisive balancing of the equities, remanded the case to
the trial court for a redetermination in the light of then existing circum-
stances." The Court indicated that the stay could not continue beyond the
first decision in the New York test case without renewed justification on
the part of the government. Although subsequent events, making the issu-
ance of a stay unnecessary,' 2 robbed it of immediate importance, the language
of the court, implicit with approval of the stay, may permit the government
to win an important procedural advantage in future constitutional litigation.
The power of a court to stay proceedings is a necessary incident of its
power to control its docket,' 3 and as such it is limited only by the boundaries
of discretion.14 In private litigation the propriety of that discretion is tested
9. See Comment (1937) 50 HARV. L. Rzv. 655.
10. Landis v. North American Co., 85 F. (2d) 398 (App. D. C. 1936). Two judges
held that the discretionary power of the court is restricted to cases involving identical
parties and issues: a third concurred in the reversal finding adequate power in the court
to grant a stay but holding that its exercise in the particular case constituted an abuse
of discretion: the fourth, disagreeing with both grounds for reversal, supported the
e-rd.lr as a ir',iper discretioary disposition of the case.
11. Over a ear had passed since the o riginal granting of the stay by the trial
t,,urt. the Ntw York ca,,e had been argued, and a decision on the merits was believed
impending. Shortly after the decision in the ptresent case by the Supreme Court. the
New York case wa, decided by the District Court. Securities and Exchange Com-
mi-.in v. Electric Bond and Share Co.. S. D. N. Y.. (1937) 4 U. S. L. WeEK 666.
See N. Y. Times. Jan. 31. 1937, § 3. p. 1. col. 8.
12. Upon the deci-ion of the trial court in the New York case upholding the regis-
trati,,, provi-i,,n of the Act, the plaintiff companies in the principal case registered
under the Act. See N. Y. Times. Feb. 10. 1937, p. 33, col. 8; id. Feb. 27, 1937, p. 21,
col. 5.
13. See End,,v %v. N. '. Life Ins. Co.. 29.3 U. S. 379, 382 (1935).
14. Kana.- Cit. 1.K' . Co. %. United States. 282 U. S. 760 (1931) ; State v. Superior
Court. 147 Wa-h). 615. 26, 'ac. 1054 (1928): White v. Cascade Oil Co., 14 Cal. App.
(2l) (9, 58 1'. .!d) 964 (1936). Some courts. however, in denying a stay speak in
term., of a limitation up in the power to act rather than a failure of justification for
it; exercise. Wi.e v. Pacilic States Life ins. Co.. I1 F. Supp. 895 (E. D. I11. 1935);
Dolbeer v. Stout. 139 N. Y. 486, 34 X. E. 1102 (1893). But the power of a court to
stay an action e"tends only to cases upon its own docket. Barnes v. Midland R. Ter-
minal Co.. 153 App. Div. 365, 138 N. Y. Supp. 546 (2d Dep't 1912).
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by a number of considerations, none of which are controlling in themselves.
In general it is said, when a stay is sought pending a decision in a related
case, that stays will be denied either if there is a threat of prejudice to one
oi the parties s or if the cases are so unrelated that a decision in one will
have no legal effect on the other action.' 0 In certain cases the identity of
the parties and the issues involved in the two actions has been determina-
tive, for, if the identity is complete, one of the actions is superfluous. 1 When,
however, there is only a partial identity of parties and issues, further con-
siderations become important. Whether a decision in one case will bind the
parties to another action,18 whether a stayed party will ha4e an opportunity
to intervene in,19 or exert control over the progress of another action,20
whether the action sought to be stayed had priority in time over the pre-
ferred case,21 Whether an adequate trial of the issues may be had in the
favored case,2 2 whether a multiplicity of actions vexing one of the litigants
can be avoided by a stay,m whether unnecessary expenditures of time and
money can be mitigated,-'4 whether the inconvenience of a delay finds com-
pensation in the achievement of a larger justice-all of these questions be-
come material.
Measured by the standards of private law cases, the stay sought by the
Commission was of doubtful propriety. The multiplicity of suits, which has
frequently justified the issuance of stay orders, was not clearly established:
much of the threatened litigation could have been dismissed on grounds
15. Croker v. N. Y. Trast Co., 206 App. Div. 11, 200 N. Y. Supp. 103 (1st Dep't
1923); Pollak v. Long Island Lighting Co., 246 App. Div. 765, 283 N. Y. Supp. 913
(2d Dep't 1935).
16. Dolbeer v. Stout, 139 N. Y. 486, 34 N. E. 1102 (1893); Dunfee v. Childs, 59
W. Va. 225, 53 S. E. 209 (1906).
17. Ryan v. Seaboard & L R. Co., 89 Fed. 397 (C. C. E. D. Va. 1898) ; Consumers'
Power Co. v. Mich. Pub. Util. Comm., 270 Mich. 213, 258 N. V. 250 (1935). Com-
pare Johnson v. N. Y. 0. & W. R. R. Co.. 3 F. Supp. 80 (E. D. N.Y. 1931). with
Southern Pacific v. Klinge, 65 F. (2d) 85 (C. C. A. 10th. 1933).
18. Kirkpatrick v. Eastern Milling & Export Co., 135 Fed. 144 (C.C.N.J. 1904):
Dolbeer v. Stout, 139 N. Y. 486, 34 N.E. 1102 (1893).
19. Kansas City S. R. Co. v. United States, 282 U. S. 760 (1931): State v. O'Con-
nor, 102 Neb. 187, 166 N.WV. 556 (1918): Pollak v. Long Island Lighting Co.. 246
App. Div. 765, 283 N. Y. Supp. 913 (2d Dep't 1935).
20. Sammons v. Parkhurst. 46 Misc. 128. 93 N. Y. Supp. 10b3 (Sup. Ct. 1905);
Dresdner v. Goldman Sachs Trading" Corp.. 240 App. Div. 242. 269 N. Y. Supp. 360
(2d Dep't 1934).
21. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Keeton. 292 Fed. 53 (C. C. A. 4th, 1923).
But cf. City of N. Y. v. Interborough Rap, Trans. Co.. 109 App. Div. 596, 96 N. Y.
Supp. 314 (1st Dep't 1905).
22. Arnold Hoffman & Co., Inc. v. Mathieson Alkali Works. 269 Fed. 62 (D. C.
R. I. 1920): Stansbury v. Koss. 10 F. Supp. 477 (S.D. N.Y. 1931).
23. Andrews v. Spear. I Fed. Cas. No. 379 (C. C. Minn. 1877): Kansas City S. R.
Co. v. United States, 282 U. S. 760 (1931).
24. Southern Pac. Co. v. Klinge. 65 F. (2d) 85 (C. C.A. 10th. 1933): Consumer's
Power Co. v. Mich. Pub. Util. Comm.. 270 Mich. 213, 258 N. W. 250 (1935).
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of improper venue,2-- and only if those suits were revived where venue was
proper would the Commission have been compelled to defend or default.
20
The burden of defending a multitude of revived actions is, however, largely
illusory 2 7 for the Commission could avoid it either by a motion to consoli-
date the suits for trial or by an independent bill of peace.28 The multiplicity
argument likewise loses much of its persuasiveness in view of an offer of
the entire utility industry to withhold litigation if the Commission would
consent to try one consolidated suit brought by the utilities. 29 The refusal
of this offer reveals that the objection of the Commission was less to defend-
ing aL multitude of expalsive 3° suits than it was to surrendering what it
regarded as the strategic advantage of trying the issue in the Southern
District of New York and against the Electric Bond and Share system. It
was to perpetuate this advantage that the stay order was invoked. The dis-
similarity of the parties in the two cases furnishes a further objection to
the propriety of the stay, particularly since the stayed plaintiffs were not
afforded an opportunity to intervene in the New York test case.31 It is also
material that the issues involved in the test case and the stayed case were
25. The failure to join the Attorney General and Postmaster General in some of
these suits would render these cases liable to dismissal for nonjoinder Carr v. Des-
jardines, (1936) 4 U. S. L. WEEx 137, (1936) 5 GEO. WAsH. L. REv. 118; National
Conference on Legalizing Lotteries v. Goldman, 85 F., (2d) 66 (C. C.A. 2d, 1936).
But cf. Consolidated Gas Co. of N. Y. v. Hardy, 14 F. Supp. 223 (S.D.N.Y. 1936).
Where these officials had been made parties to the suits, proper service could be had
only in the District of Columbia.
26. The government threatened to default in the principal case if the stay were
denied, hoping that a final decree could be set aside in the event of a subsequent
inconsistent holding by the Supreme Court in the test case. For the effect of a decree
as res adjudicata. see FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS (5th ed. 1925) §§ 212, 502, 711, 727.
27. The illusory character of the burden is further revealed by the fact that for
one year after the original granting of the stay none of these suits had been revived,
and if they should be recommenced, they would not reach trial for a year following
revival.
28. See Chafee. Bills of Peace with Multiple Parties (1932) 45 HARv. L. REv.
1297: Simpson, Fifty Years of American Equity (1936) 50 id. 171, at 246; Comment
(1932) 16 Mi-N. L. REv. 679. The Commission sought to avoid consolidation of suits
by motion or by bill of peace, as either would require the trial of one suit in the
District of Columbia. in which the utilities could participate in the formulation of the
issues and the management of the case.
29. Brief for Respondents. p. 9. Landis v. North American Company, 299 U. S. 248
(1936).
30. The only expense to the government and the only tax upon its facilities, if
realistically considered. however, would lie in preparing one consolidated suit for trial
in the District of Columbia and the compiling of briefs and the delivery of oral argu-
ments in the New York suit. as the latter case had, by the time the Supreme Court
passed upon the stay order, been argued and a decision was considered forthcoming.
31. The effect of the stay was not to relegate these parties to another forum
where they might be heard but rather to postpone their hearing in. any court, since the
District of Columbia was said to be the only proper venue for these suits. See cases
cited note 19, supra.
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of questionable similarity. In fact the issues in the former case had not
been joined at the time of the motion for a stay, and the lack of dearly
defined issues has frequently been conclusive against a stay.a- Moreover,
it was clear from the Commission's contentions that the issues were to be
confined to a scope far narrower than that sought by the stayed utilities.P
Justification for the stay on the basis of the similarity of the issues is there-
fore tenuous at best. The utilities claimed, however, that the issuance of the
stay is objectionable for the more fundamental reason that its consequences
may be materially prejudicial to them. Although the Commission offered to
submit to a temporary injunction restraining enforcement of the Act until
its constitutionality had been determined by the Supreme Court, and declared
that registration under the Act might be made with a reservation of all
constitutional rights,3 4 it may be that the utilities could not be fully protected
by any measure short of adjudication of the facts of their case by the Supreme
Court.35 The alleged source of injury was not so much the fear of criminal
prosecution as it was the cloud of uncertain legality impressed upon the
business and financial activities of the companies by the very existence of
the Act. This uncertainty, it was maintained, would be dispelled only by a
final decree on all the issues presented by the bill of these companies 3 0
Moreover, another if somewhat intangible disadvantage accrues to these
32. It has been held that a motion under these circumstances is premature. Luks
v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 213 App. Div. 623, 210 N.Y. Supp. 806 (Ist Dep't 1925). But
cf. Sears v. Leach, 185 App. Div. 577, 173 N. Y. Supp. 301 (1st Dep't 1918).
33. The Commission, while arguing in the New York case that the issues presented
there by the cross-bill were premature, sought in the principal case to demonstrate
a similarity of issues between the cases by reference to the issues in the cross-biIL
However, should the Commission prevail before the Supreme Court in establishing the
prematurity of those issues in the selected case, the same objection would require
dismissal of the bill in the principal case. If the duplication of issues is not proved
and these companies may in any event be compelled to litigate further, a stay would
ordinarily be denied. Bicalky Fan Co. v. Mosier & Summers, Inc., 177 App. Div. 372,
164 N. Y. Supp. 177 (4th Dept 1917). But cf. Stansbury v. Koss, 10 F. Supp. 477
(S.D. N.Y. 1931).
34. Brief for Petitioners, pp. 11, 12, Landis v. North American Company, 299
U. S. 248 (1936). Under similar conditions a stay was granted where the court found
that the stayed party would not be prejudiced by the order. Friedman v. Harrington,
56 Fed. 860 (C. C. Mass. 1893).
35. Even though the corporate structure of the plaintiff companies be not identical
with the Electric Bond and Share system, a decision by the Supreme Court on the
validity of the Act as applied to the latter may well settle the issues which are pre-
sently' reviewable as to the former and obviate temporarily the necessity for further
litigation by these plaintiffs. Such a decision, if sustaining the position of the trial
court in the New York case, would preclude the plaintiff companies from presenting
any issue other than those relating to registration, at least until they had registered
and could demonstrate sufficient injury from the other provisions.
36. But it was contended by the Commission that the final relief prayed for in
the plaintiff's bill was an injunction to restrain certain government agents from enforc-
ing the Act and that a temporary decree during its operative period would assure these
companies identical protection.
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litigants from the instant stay in that they are compelled to stand aside while
the Commission presents the restricted issues of the New York case on a
favorable record.
But the fact that the stay in the present case may be unorthodox as com-
pared with stays regarded as proper in private law cases, does not seem to
be an urgent objection in the perspective of constitutional politics. The court
regarded the public interest in a favorable and convenient presentation of
the constitutional questions posed by the Holding Company Act as an equity
which it could not ignore in the disposition of a petition for a stay; and
the inference to be drawn from Justice Cardozo's opinion is that the courts
may, within the limits of a cautiously guarded discretion, give the govern-
ment first choice of a test case.3 7 Whatever the merits of this concession
may be as a universal rule, postponement of trial in the present action placed
no serious burden on the plaintiff utilities, since it was distinctly probable
that the New York test case would settle most of the fundamental issues in
which they were interested, since the duration of any stay granted was to
be closely limited,38 and since the government was seeking to obtain, not
to prevent, a decision on the constitutional issues in controversy. Even as a
proposition of general application in constitutional litigation this concession to
the government may be justified. In the first place, to concede the government
the advantage of presenting its first defense of a far-reaching legislative pro-
gram in the setting it deems most conducive to a showing of constitutional
validity, does not radically extend the view that courts indulge in every pre-
sumption favoring the constitutionality of statutes. Further, the process of
testing the major federal regulatory statutes has become an epical kind of
trial by combat in which the tacticians on both sides are jockeying for pro-
cedural advantages in the ultimate hearing before the Supreme Court. In
this conflict the only alternative, if the government is not allowed to choose
37. Many concessions. unwarranted in the case of private litigants, have been
accorded the government. The United States was permitted to intervene, file proofs,
and introduce evidence in a boundary dispute without becoming a technical party to
the suit because of the broad public interest in the controversy [Florida v. Georgia,
17 How. 478 (U. S. 1855)]: a concern for the public welfare was held to be sufficient
to give the government a standing in court in the absence of that pecuniary interest
which would be required in the case of a private litigant [In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564,
584, 586 (1895)]. Statutes have been upheld giving preferences to the government in
many situations. E.g., the government may bring a direct writ of error in certain
criminal cases to the Supreme Court where no such privilege is afforded the accused
[Taylor v. United States, 207 U.S. 120 (1907)1, or where an unpaid tax was held to
be a debt within the meaning of 1 STAT. 676 (1799), 31 U. S. C. A. § 191 (1927) in
order to give the government a priority in the distribution of an insolvent's assets
[Price v. United States, 269 U. S. 492 (1926)1.
38. The Supreme Court restricted the term of the stay so as to terminate upon
a decision of the District Court in the New York case, but provided for additional
stays if the government could show adequate justification for their issuance. The
burden of demonstrating the need for an extension pending an appeal of the selected
case was placed squarely upon the government, and the order was to be renewed at
each stage of the proceedings only if that burden were properly satisfied.
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the conditions under which its statutes are first reviewed, is for the courts.
in their classical role of non-interference, to permit the circumstances of
the final appeal to be determined by wholly fortuitous developments. As a
practical matter, if the courts do not interfere, the private suitor guides the
judicial contest, especially when he is as powerful and as well-organized as
is the utility industry.39 Against the background of that reality the stay
order in the present case seems a useful and equitable strategic resource for
the government as a constitutional litigant. Furthermore, precisely the same
privilege of selecting a test case might validly be extended the government
by the enactment of a statutory provision to that effect, if safeguards similar
to those existing in the present case are adopted to protect individuals from
any unreasonable injury worked by the act.40
39. The Edison Electric Institute, by centralizing the defensive forces of the in-
dustry, has effectively contrplled the selection and disposition of cases involving the
utilities, so as to gain important strategic advantages over its opponents. See Bus.
WEE.. Nov. 16, 1935, p. 33; (1935) 15 P. U. Foar. 145; PUB. SEsr. MAG., June, 1936,
p. 167.
40. And the quantum of injury necessary -to make such a provision vulnerable under
due process of law is probably more than that traditionally required to defeat a stay in
private litigation.
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